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Decentralization is often advocated as a means of improving local
democracy and enhancing what economists call allocative efficiency. In
federal countries, where power is already divided between national and
state governments, decentralization involves the devolution of power from
state to local governments. The world’s largest federal country, India, took
an unusual step to advance decentralization: it passed the 74th
Constitutional Amendment Act to confer constitutional status on
municipalities. However, India’s efforts to promote the devolution of power
through a national urban renewal scheme have not succeeded for three
reasons. The first is that India’s decentralization process is incomplete.
Political decentralization has been stymied by the language of the
constitutional amendment itself; administrative decentralization has been
hampered by the comparative advantage of entrenched state-level
institutions; and fiscal decentralization has not occurred because financial
responsibility—but not significant revenue—has been devolved. The second
reason is that decentralization has been undertaken in a top-down manner,
which has exacerbated Center-state relations and mitigated the goal of
allocative efficiency. Third is the relative weakness of local governance
structures, which has created a Catch-22 situation: as long as the local
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governments lack significant capacity, the states are reluctant to devolve
power to them. Additional effort needs to be directed towards an effective
model of cooperative federalism. With Prime Minister Narendra Modi
poised to create “smart cities” and promote urban renewal, it is critical to
understand why India’s prior decentralization efforts have largely failed.
The lessons learned over the past decade are an important guide to the
future of cities in India as well as in other federal countries.
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INTRODUCTION
Cities are our future. They are engines of economic growth, channels
for public participation, and vehicles for improving public services and
quality of life. As of 2014, more than half of the world’s population now
lives in cities.1 Greater decentralization of power to cities is often promoted
as a way to bring decisions closer to the people,2 thereby improving local
democracy and enhancing what economists call allocative efficiency, i.e.
the matching of services to local preferences.3 But cities are not
autonomous legal actors; rather, in federal countries, their authority usually
derives from state governments. As a result, the increased devolution of
power to the local level can create tension with the states and highlight
existing constitutional imbalances of power between the state and national
governments.
Projected to have the fastest rate of urbanization in coming years,
India represents an important case study for understanding the legal
landscape in which cities are situated.4 A federal country,5 India took the
unusual step of amending its constitution to give distinct constitutional
status to municipalities. In 1992, the government of India passed the 74th
Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA), which formally recognized urban

1. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/366, at xxi (2014); Somini Sengupta, U.N. Finds Most People Now Live in Cities,
N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/more-than-half-the-globalpopulation-growth-is-urban-united-nations-report-finds.html.
2. See, e.g., GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, LOCAL GOVERNANCE: AN
INSPIRING JOURNEY INTO THE FUTURE i (2007), http://arc.gov.in/6-1.pdf (examining the “need for real
democratic decentralisation in the country in order to usher in genuine grass roots democracy”); P.K.
MOHANTY ET AL., MUNICIPAL FINANCE IN INDIA: AN ASSESSMENT 1 (2007), http://saiindia.gov.in/
english/Members_Area/Public_Financial/Courseware%20Session%20Wise/SEssion%2018%20Munici
pal%20Finance/Municipal%20Finance%20in%20India.pdf (“The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act,
1992 has mandated grassroot level democracy in urban areas . . . .”).
3. Kyoko Kuwajima, Health Sector Management and Governance in Thailand, in ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE VOL. 2: THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 190, 248 n.57 (Yasutami
Shimomura ed., 2004).
4. See K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, Revisiting the 74th Constitutional Amendment for Better
Metropolitan Governance, 48 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 86, 86 (2013) (arguing that “Indian policymakers
have been slow in responding to changing metropolitan forms and have largely visualised urbanisation
as city expansion”).
5. India is sometimes described as a quasi-federal country, as will be discussed infra. See S.P.
AIYAR, Competitive and Cooperative Trends in the Indian Federal System, in ESSAYS ON INDIAN
FEDERALISM 114, 115 (S.P. Aiyar & Usha Mehta eds., 1965) (noting that Professr Wheare used the
term “Quasi-federal” to deal with the “bewildering range of facts” present in the Indian system); V.G.
Ramachandran, Aspects of Federalism, in ESSAYS ON INDIAN FEDERALISM 58 (S.P. Aiyar & Usha
Mehta eds., 1965) (explaining that “‘quasi-federal’ is a misnomer and only means ‘virtually federal’”).
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local bodies.6 With this local-level empowerment came the opportunity to
transform not only the way that citizens engaged with their government,
but also the way that public services were delivered. But while this
constitutional amendment was enacted over twenty years ago, only within
the last decade has there been any real effort to implement these reforms in
the urban sector. Despite a constitutional mandate and significant financial
resources, the strengthening of municipalities has been difficult and the
expected gains in democracy and public service delivery have not
materialized.
This is a critical moment for understanding why India’s efforts to
decentralize power down to municipalities have met with only limited
success. Buoyed by a landslide election in the summer of 2014 and a recent
visit by U.S. President Barack Obama in January 2015, Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi is poised to launch a series of programs designed
to create modern cities that can foster economic growth. For example, India
will soon be receiving U.S. support for the construction of three “smart
cities,”7 which among other things, should be able to provide good
infrastructure such as water, sanitation, reliable utility services, and health
care.8 Modi’s election also signaled the conclusion of the Jawaharlal Nehru
National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM), India’s flagship urban
renewal program, which was created under the previous administration in
2005. Prime Minister Modi has since replaced the JnNURM with his own
urban renewal scheme, the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban
Transformation (AMRUT), which continues to tie urban renewal to
decentralization.9 The lessons learned over the past decade are an important
guide to the future of cities in India as well as in other federal countries.

6. The term “urban local bodies” (ULBs) is generally used by the government of India because
there are three tiers of urban local bodies. In this article, the term “municipalities” or “cities” is used.
The distinctions are not relevant for the purposes of this article because power can be devolved to any
of the municipal bodies. See K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, Judicial Setback for Panchayats and Local
Bodies, 45 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 43, 45–46 n.5 (2010). India also passed the 73rd Constitutional
Amendment Act in 1992, which paved the way for greater decentralization of power to rural local
bodies, known as panchayats.
7. Obama in India: US, India Sign Pact for Developing Smart Cities in Ajmer, Allahabad &
Visakhapatnam, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2015), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-0125/news/58433367_1_smart-cities-mous-agreements.
8. Draft Concept Note on Smart City Scheme 4 (Smart City Council, Working Paper, 2014),
http://india.smartcitiescouncil.com/system/tdf/india/public_resources/Concept-Note-on-Smart-City
Scheme_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=2229.
9. PM’s Remarks at the Launch of AMRUT, Smart Cities Mission and Housing for All (Urban),
PMINDIA NEWS UPDATES (June 25, 2015), http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-remarks-at-thelaunch-of-amrut-smart-cities-mission-and-housing-for-all-urban/ [hereinafter PM’s Remarks].
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As the role of cities becomes increasingly important in our global
economy, this paper highlights how constitutional design and history can
impede the effective decentralization of power. With an analysis that draws
on the legal, political economy, and urban planning literature, this article
points to three key reasons that may explain why decentralization in India
has not led to the expected gains in municipal empowerment and
effectiveness. The first is the partial nature of India’s decentralization.
Service delivery improvements are more likely to occur when political,
administrative, and fiscal decentralization are pursued simultaneously. In
India, the language of the constitutional amendment itself has stymied
political decentralization, the comparative advantage of entrenched statelevel institutions has hampered administrative decentralization, and fiscal
decentralization has not occurred because financial responsibility, but not
significant revenue, has been devolved to municipalities. The second
reason is that decentralization in India has been top-down. Priority-setting
at the national level mitigates the supposed allocative efficiency of
decentralization, whereby decision-making is brought closer to the people.
Moreover, this approach has exacerbated relations with the states, which
often perceive national efforts to empower local bodies as a means of
undermining state power. The third factor is the relative weakness of local
governance structures, which has created a Catch-22 situation.
Decentralization aims to empower local governments, but as long as local
governments lack significant capacity, states will be reluctant to devolve
power to them. In order for decentralization to succeed, more effort needs
to be directed towards an effective model of cooperative federalism.
The article begins with Indian constitutional history, outlining in
Section I the key elements of the 74th CAA, which gave constitutional
status to municipalities. Section I not only probes the underlying rationales
for the 74th CAA, but also situates India’s experience in the context of
broader economic and political theories of decentralization and
subsidiarity. A global survey of cases examining the impact of
decentralization makes clear that there are many aspects to
decentralization—and how it is implemented is critical.
Section II explores the rise of urban India. For decades, India’s
policies towards cities echoed Mahatma Gandhi’s famous remark that
“India lives in its villages.” Therefore, urban planning failed to keep step
with migration to cities, resulting in poor public services and the
proliferation of slums. Recognizing that urban areas are engines of future
economic growth, India launched a massive urban renewal program in
2005 to improve service infrastructure and rehabilitate slums in major
cities. The JnNURM marked a seismic shift in policy not only because it
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sought to promote urban renewal, but because it simultaneously promoted
local governance reforms. It breathed life into the 74th CAA, which had
been adopted over a decade earlier in 1992. Though the JnNURM created
the potential for greater decentralization, it ultimately achieved only limited
success.
Section III analyzes the roadblocks that India has faced in its efforts to
decentralize power to the municipal level. Its sub-sections address, in turn,
various barriers to achieving political, administrative, and fiscal
decentralization. As discussed in Section III.A, states can, but are not
required to, devolve power to municipalities under the 74th CAA. States
are often reluctant to do so because they perceive municipal empowerment
as a reduction of their own power vis-à-vis the central government.
Section III.B traces the limited success of India’s efforts at
administrative decentralization to municipalities’ lack of capacity and
technical expertise. Because many public services are already delivered
through state-level organizations (known as parastatals), states are hesitant
to devolve responsibility to entities that are unprepared and untested.
Finally, Section III.C suggests that fiscal decentralization has not
occurred because the devolution of financial responsibility has not been
accompanied by a sizeable increase in municipalities’ revenues. Instead,
municipalities have been encouraged to diversify their funding bases and to
tap into new revenue sources. But doing so is challenging in practice and
contradicts the theoretical efficiency gains associated with a fiscal federal
system.
The analysis highlights the critical need for effective cooperative
federalism in India. The top-down, highly centralized way in which
decentralization has been implemented has exacerbated the relationship
between the national government and the states. But because the central
government must work through the states to devolve power and funds to
municipalities, the states’ support is vital. Historically, India’s strong
central government has successfully wielded the power of the purse to
implement its own policies. As a result, India’s national urban renewal
mission tied the delivery of municipal improvement funds to mandatory
reforms at the local and state levels without the necessary level of state
consultation and support. If India truly seeks to realize the promise of
decentralization envisioned by the constitutional amendment made over
two decades ago, the nation needs to develop a more efficient and
cooperative model of federalism. The future of cities requires it.

2015

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO DECENTRALIZATION

85

I. CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT OF CITIES IN INDIA
A. India’s 74th Constitutional Amendment Act Paves the Way for
Decentralization
India is not only the world’s largest democracy, but the world’s largest
federal country.10 Constitutionally asymmetric, the national government of
India is a union of twenty-nine states11 and seven Union territories.12
Article 246 of India’s Constitution (Seventh Schedule) contains three
lists—a Union List, a State List, and a Concurrent List—that delineate the
powers of each level of government.13 Notably, power over matters not
enumerated in the State or Concurrent Lists are reserved to the central
government.14 As a result, India’s central government holds residual
powers and has overriding authority in areas subject to the Concurrent List,
where there is overlapping jurisdiction.15 India’s national government is
officially a “union” government, but is frequently referred to as the
“central” government because the national government wields significant
power as compared to the states.16

10. See Herman Bakvis & William M. Chandler, Federalism and Comparative Analysis, in
FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 3, 5 (Herman Bakvis & William M. Chandler eds., 1987).
11. The number of states in India’s federation has increased in recent years as large states split.
For example, in June 2014, India created yet another new state, Telangana, which was carved out of
Andhra Pradesh. See New State of Telangana is Born in Southern India, BBC NEWS (June 2, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-27658817.
12. SHARADA RATH, FEDERALISM TODAY 19 (1984); Rekha Saxena, Is India a Case of
Asymmetrical Federalism?, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 70, 71 (2012), http://www.unifr.ch/federalism
network/assets/files/tpl/forum_uploads/Rekha%20EPW%20ARTICLE%20ON%20ASYMMETRICAL
%20FEDERALISM.pdf (noting that given the presence of the Union territories and the unique status of
Jammu and Kashmir, India’s Constitution is constitutionally asymmetric, a term that refers to the
differing size and power of the governmental subunits).
13. INDIA CONST. art. 246.
14. INDIA CONST. Seventh Schedule, List I, ¶ 97.
15. PRATIBHA AGARWAL, FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA: IMPACT OF UNION TRANSFERS ON
STATE FINANCES 38 (2012); P.K. Chaubey, Evolution of Union-State Fiscal Relations in India: Two
Steps Forward and One Step Backward, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA 21, 21 (P.K. Chaubey ed.,
2003) [hereinafter Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations]; see also Debes Mukhopadhayay, CentreState Financial Relations in India: An Account of Major Debates, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA,
supra, at 55, 57 (noting that “the Indian Constitution exhibits ‘a federation with a strong centralizing
tendency’” (citation omitted)).
16. A federal country, India is a union of quasi-sovereign states that are guaranteed certain
powers under the Constitution. India’s national government is frequently referred to as the “central”
government, which illustrates the centralized nature of India’s federal structure and the power that the
national government wields vis-à-vis the states. See P.K. Chaubey, Federalism in India: An
Introduction, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA, supra note 15, at 1, 3–4 [hereinafter Chaubey,
Federalism in India] (noting the “[o]ver-centralisation of Federal Structure” and that the government of
India is “de jure the Union Government but de facto the Central Government”).
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In 1992, the Indian government passed the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional Amendment Acts (CAA), which gave constitutional status to
rural and urban local bodies, known as panchayats and municipalities,
respectively.17 This unique feature of India’s Constitution is absent from
some other federations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia.18
The amendments to India’s Constitution were codified in Article 243.19
Until that point, local governments in India were created by virtue of the
“ultra vires” principle,20 and, therefore, their governance was left to the
discretion of states.21
The 74th CAA’s passage marked the first time that urban local bodies
received constitutional recognition.22 The 74th CAA defines municipalities;
provides a vehicle for devolving significant administrative powers,
responsibilities, and sources of revenue to municipalities;23 and lays out a
democratic governance framework in which municipalities should
operate.24 Specifically, the 74th CAA mandates the creation of three tiers of

17. Rural local bodies in India are referred to as panchayats raj. For a discussion of judicial
review of constitutional amendments, see e.g., SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE xviii (2009) (“A
significant part of the academic and popular criticism of judicial activism of the Supreme Court is
directed to the courts’ use of the basic structure doctrine to review constitutional amendments . . . much
of this criticism emerges from a failure to adequately map the contours of constitutional judicial review
as practised in the courts today.”).
18. Roger Gibbins, Local Governance and Federal Political Systems, 53 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 163,
164 (2001) (noting that municipal governments receive no explicit mention in the constitutions of
Canada, the United States, and Australia).
19. See INDIA CONST. art. 243, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act,
1992 (dedicating article 243–243O to panchayats); INDIA CONST. art. 243, amended by The
Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 (dedicating article 243P–ZG to municipalities).
20. The term “ultra vires” means “beyond the scope of power allowed or granted . . . by law.”
Ultra vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
21. Gov’t of India Second Admin. Reforms Comm’n, supra note 2, at 13; Nat’l Inst. of Urban
Affairs, Impact of the Constitution (74th amendment) Act on the Working of Urban Local Bodies vi
(2005), http://www.niua.org/research_studies_2006.asp.
22. Gavin Shatkin & Sanjeev Vidyarthi, Introduction: Contesting the Indian City: Global Visions
and the Politics of the Local, in CONTESTING THE INDIAN CITY: GLOBAL VISIONS AND THE POLITICS OF
THE LOCAL 1, 10 (Gavin Shatkin ed., 2014). In contrast, rural local bodies, known as panchayats, were
recognized as “units of self-government” in India’s original constitution. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. 1949
art. 40 (“The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers
and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.“).
23. INDIA CONST. art. 243W–243ZG, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1992 (setting forth municipalities’ specific functions and responsibilities).
24. David Savage & Shubhagato Dasgupta, Governance Framework for Delivery of Urban
Services, in INDIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT 42, 43 (2006) (identifying salient features of the 74th
CAA); Shatkin & Vidyarthi, supra note 22, at 10; K.C. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, POWER TO THE PEOPLE?:
THE POLITICS AND PROGRESS OF DECENTRALISATION 132–45 (2000) (discussing history of how powers
for municipalities evolved into the schedule).
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local bodies, each made up of elected officials.25 In addition, the new
constitutional provisions devolve greater functional responsibilities and
financial powers to municipalities and require the creation of several
administrative bodies to oversee deliberative planning, such as Wards
Committees, District Planning Committees, and Metropolitan Planning
Committees.26 State Finance Commissions were also created as vehicles for
channeling money from the Central Finance Commission to the local
bodies.27 With the goal of creating a more representative government at the
local level, the 74th CAA also requires the regular and fair conduct of
municipal elections and the reservation of seats for persons belonging to
scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes, and women.28
But while the 74th CAA provides a platform for empowering
municipalities, it is important not to overstate their constitutional powers.
The amendment does not automatically give local bodies autonomy.
Rather, Article 243W gives states the discretion to devolve political,
administrative, and fiscal power to municipalities.29 The Supreme Court of
India underscored the discretionary nature of the states’ devolution power
in the Ranga Reddy case, which involved the interpretation of analogous
provisions for rural panchayats, under the Eleventh Schedule.30 Notably,
even the dissenting justice, who otherwise argued that the states were
obligated to devolve administrative powers, stated that because the
Constitution did not devolve legislative or judicial authority, “[i]t is
impermissible to characterize the Panchayats as the 3rd tier of the federal
structure, under the Indian constitutional scheme even after the 73rd

25. INDIA CONST. art. 243Q (using the term “Nagar Panchayat” to describe “an area in transition
from rural area to urban area”; “Municipal Council” describes a “smaller urban area”; “Municipal
Corporation” describes “larger urban area[s]”); Abhijit Datta, Municipal Reform in India: Comparative
Models and Processes, 30 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2395, 2395 (1995).
26. NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at vi.
27. See Sivaramakrishnan, supra note 24, at 167–71.
28. INDIA CONST. art. 243T; GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2,
at 9; NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at ix.
29. Under Article 243W of the Constitution, “the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow” a
municipality with any of the eighteen functions listed in the Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution.
INDIA CONST. art. 243W; P.K. Mohanty, A Municipal Financing Framework, in URBANISATION IN
INDIA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD 119, 123 (Isher Judge Ahluwalia et al.
eds., 2014).
30. See Ranga Reddy Dist. Sarpanches Ass’n v. Gov’t of Andhra Pradesh, (2004) 1 ALT 659, ¶ 6
of the concurrence (“It is for the State Legislature to decide by expressing its will through legislation or
subordinate legislation that to what extent the Panchayat Raj Institutions should be conferred with
power and authority.” (Gupta, J., concurring)); Sivaramakrishnan, supra note 6, at 46 (disagreeing with
the majority opinion, which “held that it was not obligatory on the part of a state government to assign
functions” and agreeing with the dissent, which argued that this holding reduced key parts of the
Constitution to “surplusage”).
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amendment.”31 The same analysis would likely hold true for urban local
bodies under the 74th CAA because the amendments are structurally
similar.
The Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution permits a state to devolve up
to eighteen specified powers to a municipality, including: urban planning,
regulating land-use, planning for economic and social development,
alleviating urban poverty and upgrading slums, building roads and bridges,
supplying water, and managing solid waste.32 The constitutional provision
sets forth guideposts and outer limits on what powers may be devolved,
stating that the municipalities should have “such powers and authority as
may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of selfgovernment,” but that their power may be restricted to “the preparation of
plans for economic development and social justice” and “the performance
of functions and the implementation of schemes as may be entrusted to
them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth
Schedule.”33
These constitutional amendments represent an important formal shift
in the distribution of power in India. If important political, administrative,
and fiscal functions were actually devolved by states, then municipalities
could realize the perceived benefits of decentralization, including the
promotion of grassroots democracy and improved delivery of public
services in urban areas.
B. Decentralization Theory Motivated India’s Constitutional Reforms
The passage of the 74th CAA reflects India’s embrace of the theory of
decentralization and the doctrine of subsidiarity, a principle of international
law that reflects a preference for making decisions at the lowest possible
level of government.34 Public functions are carried out at the lowest tier
31. Ranga Reddy, 1 ALT at ¶¶ 20, 37, 60 of the dissent (Raghuram, J., dissenting).
32. Mohanty, supra note 29, at 127 (classifying eighteen functions in Twelfth Schedule according
to three functions: essentially municipal functions, agency functions, and shared or concurrent
functions); Govinda Rao & Richard Bird, Governance and Fiscal Federalism, in URBANISATION IN
INDIA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 203, 211; MOHANTY
ET AL., supra note 2, at ii (noting that a state can delegate an urban municipality to implement central or
state government schemes).
33. INDIA CONST. art. 243W.
34. See Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of
Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 509, 533 (2010) (“[S]ubsidiarity mandates that
‘action should be taken at the lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately
be achieved.’” (internal citation omitted)); Albert Breton et al., Decentralization and Subsidiary:
Toward a Theoretical Reconciliation, 19 J. INT’L L. 21, 21–22 (1998) (“‘[S]ubsidiarity is the specific
claim that the burden of proof in the process of making this trade-off [between the claims of
decentralization and those of centralization] should lie in favour of decentralization,’ and ‘that when in
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possible and delegated upwards only when smaller units of governance
cannot perform the tasks effectively.35 Subsidiarity can only be achieved if
there is effective decentralization, like that envisioned by the 74th CAA.36
India’s reforms under the 74th CAA were largely motivated by the
goal of political decentralization—a desire to bring government closer to
the people and, thereby, provide more opportunities for civic participation
and for the empowerment of local officials.37 In India, municipal
empowerment through the principle of subsidiarity is perceived as a way to
create greater “grassroot[s] . . . democracy”38 and more “citizen-centric[]”39
government. It is also seen as a vehicle for providing citizens with a sense
of ownership over government programs and giving them greater ability to
participate in decision-making.40 Subsidiarity and decentralization have the
potential in India to improve efficiency, enhance local self-reliance, spur
competition, and promote innovation.41

doubt, decentralization should be preferred.’”); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle
of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 41–42 (2003). The usage of this term goes
as far back as ancient Greece, but it is strongly associated with the Catholic social theorists of the
nineteenth century. One such theorist, Pius XI, defined subsidiarity as the principle that “[j]ust as it is
gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry
and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance
of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can
do.” Id. at 42 (quoting Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical Letter on Reconstruction of Social
Order, in 3 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1903–1939, 428 (1931)).
35. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 14 (“The central idea
of subsidiarity is that citizens as sovereigns and stake-holders in a democracy are the final decisionmakers.”).
36. Id. at 15.
37. K. Dharmarajan, Power to the People: 74th Amendment, in NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS,
THE 74TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: POWER TO THE PEOPLE 63, 63 (1994) (“The 74th
Constitutional Amendment . . . seeks to provide constitutional recognition to the third-tier of the
Government and bring political power closer to the people.”); K.C. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, REVISIONING INDIAN CITIES: THE URBAN RENEWAL MISSION 94–95 (2011) (“The 74th Constitutional
Amendment has been acclaimed as a comprehensive prescription for empowerment of the ULBS.”). See
generally SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 24.
38. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at i; MOHANTY ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 1.
39. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 13.
40. Savage & Dasgupta, supra note 24, at 42 (“Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest
in and growing consciousness of the need and importance of local self-government as a provider of
services to the community as well as an instrument of democratic self-government.”). See generally
Priyam Das, Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Urban Service Delivery in India: Is
Institutionalizing Enough?, in DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNANCE: REFORMS & INNOVATIONS IN ASIA
112, 122 (G. Shabbir Cheema ed., 2013).
41. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 14–16 ( “[I]f
democracy is to be real and meaningful, the locus of power should shift as close to the citizen as
possible in order to facilitate direct participation, constant vigil and timely intervention.”).
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India’s approach is in line with broader political theory on
decentralization, which suggests that by encouraging public participation,
decentralization leads to governance that is more creative, responsible, and
effective.42 For example, decentralization allows local administrators to test
innovative ideas without justifying their adoption on a national scale.43
Across the world, decentralization is a means for “democratic local
governance,” which gives citizens and their elected local representatives
more power in public decision-making.44 The rationale is that it is generally
easier for the average citizen to gain access to local—as opposed to
national—political forums. Local public participation has the advantage of
highlighting gaps in basic service provision, which local leaders can then
try to fix. Under certain situations, decentralization may also improve
human rights outcomes, though this largely depends on the way in which
decentralization efforts are implemented.45
The promise of more effective outcomes has fueled the drive towards
decentralized governance in India.46 As stated in the Twelfth Five Year
Plan of India, “[t]he principle of subsidiarity is now well established in
development literature across the world. The role of local governments in
ensuring efficient and accountable delivery of basic services is now well
42. Hans F. Illy, Decentralisation: A Worldwide Trend, in FEDERALISM AND
DECENTRALISATION: CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS IN INDIA AND GERMANY 26, 30 (Gert W. Kueck et al.
eds., 1998).
43. Id. at 30–31.
44. Harry Blair, Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local
Governance in Six Countries, 28 WORLD DEV. 21, 21, 23–26 (2000), http://isites.harvard.edu/
fs/docs/icb.topic793411.files/Wk%205_Oct%201st/Blair_2000_Local%20Governance%20in%20Six%
20Countries.pdf; see also Nancy Thede, Decentralization, Democracy and Human Rights: A Human
Rights-Based Analysis of the Impact of Local Democratic Reforms on Development, 10 J. HUM. DEV. &
CAPABABILITIES 103, 104–05 (2009) (“[D]ecentralization as democratic reform . . . has been inspired
by two separate logics: on the one hand, that of the pro-democracy movements in southern countries;
and on the other, the governance reforms piloted by the international financial institutions (IFIs).”).
45. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 21
(stating in Article 21 that “[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of [one’s] country”).
But see INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, LOCAL RULE: DECENTRALISATION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 19–21, 23–30, (2002), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/15C8B99E9E0E8
85CC1257 50B00503166-ICHRP_Jan2002.pdf (finding that decentralization does not always lead to
the increased realization of human rights, but that it is more likely to happen when the decentralization
effort (1) “enhances political rights” (2) “leads to more effective government” (3) “helps to achieve
economic and social rights” (4) “promotes accountability”, and (5) “increases local autonomy and
empowers disadvantaged group[s]”).
46. See GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at v (identifying core
principles underpinning this agenda which include: “democratic decentralisation as the centre-piece of
governance reforms in the country; the principle of subsidiarity which means that what can best be done
at the lower levels of government should not be centralised at higher levels; a clear delineation of
functions entrusted to the local bodies; effective devolution in financial terms and convergence of
services for the citizens as well as citizens centric governance structures”).
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understood.”47 A key premise of the 74th CAA is that “[l]ocal governments
are ideally suited to provide services like water supply, solid waste
management, sanitation, etc., as they are closer to the people and in a better
position to appreciate their concerns and even economic principles state
that such services are best provided at the level of government closest to
the people.”48 Moreover, by giving citizens greater responsibility for the
hard choices that need to be made,49 fiscal responsibility is expected to
improve because people are better positioned to see the link between taxes
and municipal resource generation and service outcomes.50
Decentralization is expected to improve economic efficiency because
of local government’s increased accountability to its citizens and better
knowledge of their preferences. Devolution of certain tasks to local
governments is often advocated on the grounds that it will lead to an
improvement in “allocative efficiency” and “productive efficiency.”
Allocative efficiency is defined as “better matching of public services to
local needs,”51 while productive efficiency refers to the ability to produce a
good at the lowest possible cost. The idea is that local officials are better
positioned than central government officials to implement certain
initiatives, provided that the effective coordination mechanisms are in
place.52 Moreover, citizens can theoretically hold local officials
accountable by “vot[ing] with their feet”— moving to states that offer the

47. PLANNING COMM’N, GOV’T OF INDIA, TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2012-2017): FASTER,
MORE INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH - VOLUME I 328 (2013), http://planning
commission.gov.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/12fyp_vol1.pdf; see also HIGH POWERED EXPERT
COMM. (HPEC) FOR ESTIMATING THE INV. REQUIREMENTS FOR URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVS.,
REPORT ON INDIAN URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 104 (2011), http://icrier.org/pdf/
FinalReport-hpec.pdf [hereinafter HPEC REPORT] (noting that the creation of institutions such as a
Local Body Ombudsman can play a significant role in efforts to improve accountability).
48. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 10; see also
THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH FINANCE COMMISSION (2010–2015)
149 (2009) (“Providing basic services at the grassroots level makes them the primary interface of the
citizens’ interaction with the government. The principle of subsidiarity implies that matters are best
handled by the least centralised competent authority. Following this, these institutions need to be
adequately empowered—both functionally and financially—to enable them to fulfil the role envisaged
for them in the Constitution.”).
49. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 14.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Kuwajima, supra note 3, at 192.
52. See Illy, supra note 42, at 30 (“The efficiency of the central government could be increased
through decentralisation by relieving top management officials of routine tasks that could be more
effectively performed by field staff or local officials.”); Anand N. Asthana, Decentralisation, HRD and
Production Efficiency of Water Utilities: Evidence from India, 14 WATER POL’Y 112, 112 (2012)
(noting that in some cases decentralization is associated with the neglect of human resources
development that ultimately lowers productive efficiency).
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unique bundle of goods that they prefer.53 Decentralization is also expected
to reduce bureaucracy and improve knowledge of local costs, all of which
leads to higher levels of productive efficiency.54
But research from around the world has highlighted situations in
which the theoretical benefits of decentralization have not materialized.
Decentralization does not always achieve its economic efficiency goals;
rather, decentralization can exacerbate corruption55 and tax evasion.56 Nor
does decentralization necessarily guarantee more responsible governance.
Because citizens in poor countries lack resources, they cannot ensure that
the bundle of services provided by their local government matches their
preferences by “voting with their feet.”57 Additionally, local governments
in poor countries may not be concerned about the departure of residents
who are a perceived drain on resources.58 Indeed, even if residents were to
move due to dissatisfaction with service delivery and local governments
were to revise policy in response, “strong incentives to orient their policies
toward more mobile groups” make it unlikely that the changes would

53. Rao & Bird, supra note 32, at 205; Pranab Bardhan, Governance Issues in Delivery of Public
Services, 13 J. AFR. ECONS. i167 (2004).
54. Satu Kahkonen & Anthony Lanyi, Decentralization and Governance: Does Decentralization
Improve Public Service Delivery?, PREM NOTES, June 2001, No. 55; see also Alfred P. Montero &
David J. Samuels, The Political Determinants of Decentralization in Latin America: Causes and
Consequences, in DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 3, 25–26 (Alfred P.
Montero & David J. Samuels eds., 2004) (noting that the evidence of decentralization leading to
increased accountability has been strong in the Latin American context); Iwan Barankay & Ben
Lockwood, Decentralization and the Productive Efficiency of Government: Evidence from Swiss
Cantons, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1197, 1197 (2007), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S00472
72706001654 (exploring the relationship between decentralization and productive efficiency).
55. See generally Kilkon Ko & Hui Zhi, Fiscal Decentralization: Guilty of Aggravating
Corruption in China?, 22 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 35, 35 (2013) (noting that fiscal decentralization can
increase corruption if law enforcement is weak). See also Christian Lessman & Gunther Markwardt,
One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats, 38 WORLD DEV.
631, 631 (2009) (finding that decentralization can increase corruption in countries in which press
freedom is restricted).
56. See Jan K. Brueckner, Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: The Effects of Local
Corruption and Tax Evasion, 1 ANNALS ECON. & FIN. 1, 1 (2000) (finding that the phenomena of local
corruption and tax evasion did “indeed limit the benefits of fiscal decentralization”).
57. Bardhan, supra note 53, at i168; See Rao & Bird, supra note 32, at 205.
58. Omar Azfar et al., Political Disciplines on Local Government: Evidence from the Philippines,
in DEVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT: GOVERNANCE PROSPECTS IN DECENTRALIZING STATES 197, 199
(Mwangi S. Kimenyi & Patrick Meagher eds., 2004). The authors’ analysis focused on the Philippines,
and they found that in this case, migration in response to service delivery offerings is fairly limited and
instead seems to be mostly driven by unemployment. Id. The authors also note that even if citizens in
developing countries are mobile, they likely will not be mobile enough to achieve the desired level of
allocative efficiency. Id.
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reflect the interests of all citizens.59 Additionally, allocative efficiency may
not be achieved in countries with heterogeneous local communities because
differences in preferences between two local communities may be too
negligible.60 Finally, decentralization may be problematic in countries
pursuing large scale redistributive policies because local governments may
be particularly ill-suited to the task of redistribution.61
Similarly, decentralization may not have the intended political impact
of promoting participatory, grassroots democracy.62 A clear distinction
exists between technical participation, which merely encourages “citizen
voice,” and ensuring that the opinions of the poor and socially marginalized
are heard by those in power.63 If local citizens disagree with the way that
the local authority is managing a resource or service, it may be tempting for
officials to assume that the community lacks knowledge or capacity.64
While the poor or socially marginalized have more opportunities to
publicly express their opinions, they may, nonetheless, have no more power
in the decision-making process. Decentralized decision-making may be
59. SEBASTIAN ECKARDT, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DECENTRALIZED SERVICE DELIVERY 49–50
(2006).
60. See, e.g., Jeff Dayton-Johnson, Determinants of Collective Action on the Local Commons: a
Model with Evidence From Mexico, 62 J. DEV. ECON. 181, 181–82 (2000) (noting in a study on
Mexican irrigation societies that more heterogeneous societies are likely to experience lower group
performance and infrastructure maintenance); see also Melissa Leach, et al., Environmental
Entitlements: Dynamics and Institutions in Community-Based Natural Resource Management, 27
WORLD DEV. 225, 226 (1999) (critiquing the assumption often made in this literature about the
existence of a relatively homogenous community that can be a subject of reform).
61. See Amaresh Bagchi, Rethinking Federalism: Changing Power Relations Between the Center
and the States, 33 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 21, 38 (2003), http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/33/
4/21.abstract (noting that there are “trade-offs” to delegating power to regional and local governments);
see also Nirvikar Singh, Decentralization and Public Delivery of Health Care Services in India, 27
HEALTH AFF. 991, 991–99 (2008) (suggesting that a failure to implement decentralization at the local
level disadvantaged public health service delivery in the early 2000s).
62. Das, supra note 40, at 114 (“Participation, however, has sometimes served to disenfranchise
groups already marginalized by manufacturing consensus for policies that were created elsewhere and
overlooking alternatives.” (internal citations omitted)).
63. Richard Crook, Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of Local–
Central Relations, 23 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 77, 79 (2003), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/
pad.261/abstract (internal citation omitted); see also Leach et al., supra note 60, at 228 (“[A]ll too often
it is implied that the public airing of conflict is sufficient, and that social consensus and solidarity will
necessarily result.” (internal citation omitted)).
64. Jon Anderson, Four Considerations for Decentralized Forest Management: Subsidiarity,
Empowerment, Pluralism, and Social Capital, in DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVOLUTION OF FOREST
MANAGEMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (T. Durst et al. eds., 2000) (“[F]orest services sometimes
assume that because local groups do not agree with central expert authorities on how forests should be
managed, that they must lack capacities or knowledge. Indeed, if local citizens disagree with the way
that the local authority is managing a resource or service, it may be tempting for the officials to simply
assume that the community lacks knowledge or capacity.”), http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6898e/
x6898e02a.htm#P69_19234.
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subject to elite capture, i.e., the misappropriation of resources by the
community’s elite in order to serve their own interests, which may
reproduce power structures.65
Different forms of decentralization exist, including political,
administrative, and fiscal decentralization, and much depends on the
manner in which any given form is implemented.66 Partial decentralization
may also stymie the intended benefits.67 For example, if the central
government devolves some powers but retains control over others, local
governments will be less able to respond to local preferences and the goal
of allocative efficiency will not be achieved.68
In the Indian context, decentralization has not achieved its promised
benefits because—as the analysis below illustrates—decentralization has
only been partially implemented. Moreover, while 74th CAA was passed in

65. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii (“[I]n situations of
sharp local inequalities, decentralisation sometimes heightens the concentration of power, and
discourages rather than fosters participation among the underprivileged. To illustrate, in some tribal
areas where upper caste landlords and traders dominate village affairs, the devolution of power
associated with the Panchayati Raj amendments has consolidated their hold and reinforced existing
biases in the local power structure.”). See generally INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra
note 45, at 10 (noting that decentralization may undermine democracy by allowing local elites to
capture the government, and emphasizing that in order for decentralization to be associated with human
rights realization, participatory governance and accountable local governance need to be encouraged);
Crook, supra note 63 (discussing empirical studies from Sub-Saharan Africa in which marginalized
social groups have been the most excluded from the political process); Sanjay Kumar, Does
“Participation” in Common Pool Resource Management Help the Poor? A Social Cost–Benefit
Analysis of Joint Forest Management in Jharkhand, India, 30 WORLD DEV. 763 (2002), (finding that
joint management of forests in India “reflects the social preference of the rural nonpoor”); Everisto
Mapedza & Kim Geheb, Power Dynamics and Water Reform in the Zimbabwean Context: Implications
for the Poor, 12 WATER POL’Y 517 (2010) (discussing a case study on the decentralization of the water
sector in Zimbabwe where a new law led to more small-scale farmers attending local meetings, but the
process was still driven, and in some instances manipulated, by commercial farmers who were
economically better off); George Mathew, Panchayati Raj Institutions and Human Rights in India, 38
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 155 (2003) (noting that evidence from rural India suggests that greater devolution
of power to the Panchyati Raj has exacerbated inter-caste inequities, and in some cases, resulted in
caste-related violence around local elections. For example, “[i]n Melavalavu [a village in Tamil Nadu],
the dominant castes of the area murdered the panchayat president and the vice-president who both
belonged to a lower caste, merely because they dared to fight the panchayat elections.”).
66. Different Forms of Decentralization, THE WORLD BANK GRP., http://www1.worldbank.org/
publicsector/decentralization/what.htm#1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
67. Shantayanan Devarajan et al., The Politics of Partial Decentralization, in DOES
DECENTRALIZATION ENHANCE SERVICE DELIVERY AND POVERTY REDUCTION? 102, 107 (Etisham
Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio eds., 2009) (defining partial decentralization as “the situation when local
governments are not held accountable for a complete set of budgetary allocations and their outcomes”).
68. See generally Richard C. Crook, Four Years of the Ghana District Assemblies in Operation:
Decentralization, Democratization and Administrative Performance, 14 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 339
(1994), for the notion that local autonomy is achieved by allocating power in local government
authority.
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1992, it was not seriously implemented until the JnNURM, a massive
scheme adopted in 2005 with twin goals: the improvement of urban
infrastructure and basic services through a series of reforms designed to
promote municipal empowerment.69 But the JnNURM faced a large hurdle:
the continually deteriorating performance of municipalities.70 The next
section considers the challenges facing urban India before exploring
existing barriers to political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization.
II. THE RISE OF URBAN INDIA
A. Urban Areas in India Were Historically Neglected
“India lives in its villages.” Mahatma Gandhi’s famous phrase defined
India for many decades and illustrates the historical bias against urban area
development.71 To reduce urban migration, cities were not provided with
much infrastructure or industrial support.72 However, the last two decades
have seen a renewed interest in urban areas fueled by economic
liberalization,73 recognition that cities are engines of growth, and
decentralization trends.74 India will soon include some of the topperforming, “growth-contributing” cities in the world.75
More than ever before, cities are perceived as the building blocks of
the global economy. This development is primarily attributable to two key
trends. First, the proportion of the world’s population that lives in cities is
growing and will continue to grow. Indeed, the world just reached a

69. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 24, at 14–15; see also id. at 91–104 (noting that adherence
to the 74th CAA was among the mandatory reforms required by the JnNURM and more broadly
discussing reform efforts).
70. NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at vi.
71. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37, at 1; Lorraine Kennedy & Marie Helen Zerah, The Shift
to City-Centric Growth Strategies: Perspectives from Hyderabad and Mumbai, 43 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 110, 111–12 (2008), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/The%20shift%20to%20
city%20 centric_0.pdf.
72. Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 111–12; see also Rakesh Mohan & Shubhagato
Dasgupta, The 21st Century: Asia Becomes Urban, 40 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 213, 217 (2005) (“[I]n
most developing countries especially those in Asia, urbanisation is still often viewed as a disease, and a
trend that needs to be reversed.”).
73. MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at ii (“After liberalisation of the economy, India made strides
in economic growth; a large part of it has been through the contribution of urban areas.”).
74. See generally MINISTRY OF URBAN EMP’T & POVERTY ALLEVIATION & MINISTRY OF URBAN
DEV., JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL URBAN RENEWAL MISSION (JNNURM) OVERVIEW 3,
http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/UIGOverview.pdf [hereinafter JNNURM OVERVIEW
3] (projecting urban population growth); Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 112.
75. MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., URBAN WORLD: MAPPING THE ECONOMIC POWER OF CITIES 1
(2011) (anticipating that by 2025, 136 new cities will make it on to the list of top 600 cities with the
greatest effect on global growth—thirteen of these cities will be in India).
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historic milestone: more than half of the world’s population now lives in
cities.76 By 2050, the global urbanization rate is expected to reach seventy
percent.77 Second, cities make up an increasing proportion of total global
economic output.78 For example, a 2007 McKinsey study that ranked world
cities by their contribution to global growth found that while the top 100
cities produced twenty-one trillion dollars in GDP in 2007, or thirty-eight
percent of the global total, they are expected to produce sixty-four trillion
dollars in GDP, or nearly sixty percent of the global total, in 2025.79
Increases in urban economic output and the growing proportion of the
world’s population that lives in cities highlight the need for increased
attention to the role that cities play in the global economy.
India will soon have the fastest global rate of urbanization, due to a
large increase in its youth population.80 Between 2014 and 2050, the
number of urban dwellers in India is expected to increase by 404 million.81
Compared to other rapidly developing countries like China, India is
comparatively less urbanized, but that will soon change.82 The capital of
India, New Delhi, has approximately doubled its population since 1990 and
became the world’s second most populous city in 2014; with nearly 25
million people, it has nearly three times the population of New York City.83
Another Indian megacity, Mumbai, is within the top ten most populous
cities in the world.84 As of 2011, approximately 377 million people
constituting about thirty-one percent of India’s population lived in urban
areas.85 With India’s continued rapid urban growth, this figure is expected

76. UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 1.
77. UN-HABITAT, UN-HABITAT: STATE OF THE WORLD’S CITIES 2006/2007 (2007), http://
www.un habitat.org/documents/media_centre/sowcr2006/SOWCR%205.pdf.
78. See Mohan & Dasgupta, supra note 72, at 214 (“Urbanisation is promoted by (i) economies of
scale in production particularly in manufacturing; (ii) the existence of information externalities; (iii)
technology development, particularly in building and transportation technology; (iv) substitution of
capital for land as made possible by technological developments.”).
79. MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., supra note 75.
80. Sengupta, supra note 1.
81. UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 1 (“In 2014, the proportion of the
population living in urban areas was 39 percent in lower-middle-income countries and 30 per cent in
low-income countries. By 2050, these countries are expected to reach, on average, 57 and 48 percent
urban, respectively.”).
82. Isher Judge Ahluwalia et al., Challenges of Urbanisation in India: An Overview, in
URBANISATION IN INDIA:CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 1,
2 (noting that urban populations in other countries are: “45 per cent in China, 54 per cent in Indonesia,
and 87 per cent in Brazil”); Sengupta, supra note 1.
83. Population: Current Population Estimates, DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, N.Y.C., (2015), http://
www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml (last visited Sept. 23, 2015); Sengupta, supra note 1.
84. Sengupta, supra note 1.
85. Ahluwalia et al., supra note 82, at 2.
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to rise to about forty percent by the year 2021,86 and by 2031, to comprise
around 600 million people.87
The sheer size of the urban population presents an enormous challenge
where shelter, civic amenities, public health, and social security are
concerned.88 In terms of population, most of the larger states in India would
be among the biggest countries in the world; even a large-sized district in
India would be larger than about eighty nations in terms of population.89 A
huge amount of funding is required to transform urban infrastructure;
investments for the period between 2011 and 2031 are estimated to be 3.9
trillion Indian rupees, which is approximately sixty-three billion U.S.
dollars.90
Despite its emerging economy, growing middle class and increasing
international clout, India is also home to millions of people living in
poverty. The rapid unplanned settlement of large tracts of land has led to a
huge peri-urban population, which is not always counted in urban
statistics.91 Historical neglect of cities has led to poor public services and
housing, which have, in turn, contributed to the proliferation of slums.92
The urbanization of rural poverty as villagers move to cities in search of
economic opportunity has also contributed to the expansion of slums.93
Mega-cities like Mumbai, where more than half the population live in
slums,94 account for approximately fifty-six percent of the urban
population; this reflects the geographic distribution of economic
opportunities.95 The state of infrastructure and civic services in India

86. See generally JNNURM OVERVIEW 3, supra note 74.
87. Ahluwalia et al., supra note 82, at 2.
88. MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
89. See GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 21 (“[The state of]
Uttar Pradesh would be larger than the world’s sixth largest country.”).
90. HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 35 (The figure in the report is listed as 39.2 lakh crores,
which translates to 3.9 trillion crores).
91. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at iv.
92. Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 112; see also NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, URBAN
GOVERNANCE DECENTRALIZATION IN INDIA, at x (2004), http://www.niua.org/Publications/
research_studies/urban_governance/urban%20governance_Summary.pdf (noting that many of the
government schemes during the seventies and early eighties were targeted at just a few large cities,
benefiting mostly high and middle-income communities).
93. MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at 5. But see Ahluwalia et al., supra note 82, at 2 (“Ruralurban migration contributed only about 20 per cent to the growth of urban population.”).
94. P.K. DAS & ASSOCS., PLANNERS & ARCHITECTS, MUMBAI’S SLUMS MAP-2 (2011),
http://www.pk das.com/published/Mumbai%27sSlumsMap-LandReservations.pdf.
95. HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 18; Rao & Bird, supra note 32, at 203.
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remains dire.96 As the former Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh
stated, “A major failure of city governance has been our inability to address
the needs of the poor . . . Cities need people to provide services and our
people need a decent place to live.”97
B. In an Important Policy Shift, India Linked Urban Renewal to
Decentralization
Over a decade after the passage of the 74th CAA, the government of
India launched a national scheme designed to simultaneously promote
urban renewal and decentralize power to municipalities. Created in 2005,
the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM) sought
to improve urban infrastructure and expand basic services in urban areas,
including slums, through a series of local governance reforms.98 This was
not the first government scheme introduced to improve urban areas.99 But
the JnNURM scheme represented an important policy shift because it also
sought to realize the potential of the 74th CAA by linking financial
assistance for infrastructure and service delivery to the promotion of
decentralization and municipal empowerment.100 Consistent with the
economic and political theories of decentralization, the JnNURM scheme
was grounded in idea that strengthening municipal government is the key to
increased urban growth and poverty alleviation.
Although the JnNURM was not extended by Prime Minister Modi’s
administration, it is critical to understand the lessons of this urban
decentralization experiment. The JnNURM required that target cities
develop frameworks for twenty to twenty-five years, with five-year
updates.101 It initially consisted of two related schemes: (1) Sub-Mission
for Urban Infrastructure and Governance, which focused on water supply
and sanitation, sewerage, solid waste management, road network, urban
96. MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at 5 (“The floods in Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad and
Bangalore in the recent past have exposed the vulnerability of cities, their fragile ecology, weak
infrastructure systems, faulty planning, long records of under-investment and fiscal imbalances.”).
97. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Speech at the Launch of the Jawaharlal Nehru National
Urban Renewal Mission, (Dec. 3, 2005), pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=13823.
98. Ahluwalia et al., supra note 82, at 45–47; HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 29; see generally
SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37 (comprehensively discussing the JnNURM).
99. See generally SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37, at 2–12 (discussing prior policy efforts);
Savage & Dasgupta, supra note 24, at 46–47 (providing summary of key Government of India policies
designed to improve the quality of life in urban areas).
100. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 22–26; Kennedy &
Zerah, supra note 71, at 112–13; Savage & Dasgupta, supra note 24, at 56 (noting that the JnNURM
represents a “significant shift in public policy” by focusing more on accountability).
101. See SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37, at 17–46 (providing an overview of the JnNURM
scheme and its components).
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transport, and redevelopment of old city areas and was managed by the
Ministry of Urban Development; and (2) Sub-Mission for Basic Services to
the Urban Poor (BSUP), which emphasized integrated development of
slums, including projects for providing shelter, basic services, and other
related civic amenities and was administered by the Ministry of Urban
Employment and Poverty Alleviation.102 These two programs targeted
sixty-five cities of national importance.103 In addition, two programs were
created under JnNURM for other cities and towns: Urban Infrastructure
Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) and
Integrated Housing & Slum Development Program (IHSDP).104 While UIG
and UIDSSMAT are city-wide infrastructure-oriented programs, BSUP and
ISHDP are directed towards creating housing and basic amenities for the
urban poor, especially slum-dwellers.105
The JnNURM also sought to promote grassroots democracy through
citizen-oriented municipal reforms. Participating cities were expected to
formulate City Development Plans that identified appropriate projects. For
each project, the city or appropriate parastatal agency—usually a semiautonomous public corporation—prepared a Detailed Project Report
identifying the life-cycle costs of the project, including capital outlays,
operations, and maintenance. Once approved, the funds flowed from the
central government to the state government and, finally, to the designated
“State Level Nodal Agency,” which disbursed them. Most importantly for
the purposes of this article, the JnNURM not only linked infrastructure
financing to governance reforms at the state and local levels, but looked to
the 74th CAA and community participation as vehicles for achieving
reform.106

102. JNNURM OVERVIEW 3, supra note 74, at 5–6.
103. GRANT THORNTON, APPRAISAL OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL URBAN RENEWAL
MISSION (JNNURM) 253 (2011), http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Appraisal-ofJnNURM-Final-Report-Volume-I-.pdf; MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, GOV’T
OF INDIA, OVER ALL PROGRESS OF JNNURM UNDER BSUP AND IHSDP- NATIONAL LEVEL (2015),
http://ipomstest.cgg.gov.in/jnnurm/Jnnurm_Ray_AHP_Progress_Report/Jnnurm_Glance_All_Progress.
pdf (noting that as of January 2015, 481 BSUP projects in 62 cities/towns and 1,037 IHSDP projects in
887 cities/towns were implemented for a total project cost of 31,732.77 crore’s of rupees); PLANNING
COMM’N, GOV’T OF INDIA, TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2012-2017): ECONOMIC SECTORS - VOLUME II,
at 1, 353 (2013), http://planning commission.nic.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/vol_2.pdf [hereinafter
TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II].
104. THORNTON, supra note 103.
105. See id. (introducing the JnNURM mission).
106. Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 113 (“These reforms aim to alter rules and regulations
relating to urban development by clarifying institutional responsibilities, repealing land regulations,
modernising the functioning of municipalities, enhancing their revenues and fiscal responsibility,
among other things.”).
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The JnNURM led to increased investment in urban areas, though there
were significant implementation challenges.107 The central government’s
initial outlay of approximately 661 billion rupees (10.7 billion U.S. dollars)
resulted in an overall commitment of approximately 1.237 trillion rupees
(20 billion U.S. dollars) during the first seven years (2005–2012).108 While
the scheme officially ended in 2012, it was extended for another two years
until 2014.109 The Congress-led government of Manmohan Singh had been
planning to launch a second phase of JnNURM, which was to dispense
with the concept of “mission cities” and, instead, cover all towns and
cities.110 The government had also proposed other revisions to streamline
the scheme and reduce overlap with other national programs. 111
But recently elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi replaced the
JnNURM with his own urban renewal scheme, known as the Atal Mission
for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT).112 The AMRUT

107. See Smriti Kak Ramachandran, Urban Renewal Mission a Failure: CAG, HINDU (Dec. 1,
2012), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/urban-renewal-mission-a-failure-cag/article
4152567.ece (describing implementation challenges).
108. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 322 (as reported, the initial outlay
was 66,085 crore and the overall commitment was 123,711 crore; one crore is equal to 10 million);
Isher Judge Ahluwalia, Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery, in URBANISATION IN INDIA:
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 31, 46 (“The Government of
India committed 66,000 [rupees] crore over the Mission period of seven years (extended later to nine)
as its share in the total investment of over 100,000 [rupees] crore for a pool of selected projects to be
proposed by the ULBs and state governments and approved by the Government of India.”).
109. Deepak Nagpal, Narendra Modi Government to Drop Jawaharlal Nehru’s Name from
JNNURM?, ZEE NEWS (Aug.12, 2014), http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/narendra-modigovernment-to-drop-jawaharlal-nehru-s-name-from-jnnurm_954093.html.
110. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 353. But see generally SAMA
KHAN, THE OTHER JNNURM: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR SMALL TOWNS IN INDIA? (2014), http://cpr
india.org/sites/default/files/The%20Other%20JNNURM.pdf (discussing bias against small towns).
111. The JnNURM II was to have these components: (1) Urban Infrastructure and Governance
(UIG); (2) Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY); (3) Slum rehabilitation in cities not covered under RAY; and (4)
a separate fund dedicated to Capacity Building. Under the five-year budget for the JnNURM set forth in
Twelfth Five Year Plan, the first three programs would receive 80 percent of the funding; the Capacity
Building program would receive 10 percent; and an additional Incentive Fund would receive the final
10 percent. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, GOV’T OF INDIA, OFFICE
MEMORANDUM: EXTENSION OF TIME PERIOD BY ONE YEAR UP TO 2014–15 FOR COMPLETION OF
PROJECTS SANCTIONED TILL MARCH 2012 AND IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS UNDER THE SUBMISSION ON BASIC SERVICES TO THE URBAN POOR (BSUP) AND INTEGRATED HOUSING AND SLUM
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (IHSDP) - COMPONENTS OF THE JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL URBAN
RENEWAL MISSION (JNNURM) (2013), https://jnnurmmis.nic.in/jn nurm_hupa/jnnurm/jnnurm_
Extension_2014-15_19_09_2013.pdf (noting that BSUP and IHSDP programs would be discontinued
but be given an additional extension until March 2015 to complete existing projects); TWELFTH FIVE
YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 338–39, 353–54 (noting that the slum rehabilitation
scheme known as Rajiv Awas Yojana would be integrated into the JnNURM-II).
112. PM’s Remarks, supra note 9.
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has a wider geographic scope than the JnNURM, focusing on 500 cities113
as opposed to sixty-five.114 Despite their differences, the JnNURM and the
AMRUT have a critical similarity. By providing greater funds to those
states that devolve power down to the municipal level, both encourage
decentralization using the promise of urban renewal funds.115 Among other
programs, 116 Modi has also created a “Smart Cities” program117 and a
“Housing for All” campaign that aims to make affordable housing available
for all by 2022.118
As India prepares to enter a new phase of urban renewal under Prime
Minister Modi, the time is ripe for reflecting on the successes and failures
of the JnNURM. The government of India has acknowledged many of the
JnNURM’s shortcomings, including variable results across the country;
lack of capacity at the local level to implement reforms; incomplete
governance and financial reforms; an inability to leverage additional
financial resources from the private sector via public-private partnerships;
and the dominant role of the central government.119 Despite programs

113. MINISTRY OF URBAN DEV., GOV’T OF INDIA, ATAL MISSION FOR REJUVENATION AND URBAN
TRANSFORMATION: MISSION STATEMENT AND GUIDELINES 6 (2015), http://amrut.gov.in/
writereaddata/ AMRUT%20Guidelines%20.pdf [hereinafter ATAL MISSION].
114. See generally Amitabh Kundu, India’s Sluggish Urbanisation and its Exclusionary
Development, in URBAN GROWTH IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: LESSONS FROM THE BRICS 191, 191–
232 (2014) (analyzing India’s urban growth in contrast with other countries); ATAL MISSION, supra
note 113 (drawing attention to the scheme’s emphasis on cities with 100,000 people or more and its
strong focus on improving the water supply, sewerage and septage management, storm water drainage,
urban transport and the development of green spaces and parks).
115. ATAL MISSION, supra note 113, at 8–9. The way in which the JnNURM and the AMRUT tie
funding to reform adoption is different. The JnNURM employs a more punitive model—states that are
found not complying with the plan’s timeline for the devolution of powers are denied funds that they
would have otherwise been able to access. In contrast, AMRUT employs an incentive based model in
which states that are found in compliance are given additional funds. A full ten percent of AMRUT’s
initial plan outlay has been earmarked for these incentive payments. Id.
116. See, e.g., PM Modi’s Digital India Campaign All Set to Roll Out Next Month, INDIA TODAY
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-modis-digital-india-campaign-all-set-to-roll-outnext-month/1/393789.html (noting that in the first stage of this campaign, the central government
hopes to provide free Wi-Fi to 2,500 cities in towns and that campaign is believed to take at least three
years).
117. But see Persis Taraporevala, Creating Subjects in Lavasa: The Private City, OPEN SECURITY
(Apr. 16, 2013), https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/persis-taraporevala/creating-subjects-inlavasa-private-city (outlining concerns about a trend in India towards the creation of cities that are
governed by corporations that have no democratic governance structure).
118. PM Narendra Modi Reviews Preparations for “Housing for All” Project, ECON. TIMES (Jan.
21, 2015), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-01-21/news/58306298_1_ program meprime-minister-narendra-modi-national-housing-bank.
119. See HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 33 (drawing attention also to the lack of clarity in the
reforms and the unwillingness of state governments to devolve power down to local governments);
Ahluwalia, supra note 108, at 50–52; TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 323.
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intended to provide basic services to the urban poor, this goal has remained
largely unmet.120 The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India
also found that the JnNURM’s attempt to strengthen urban local bodies was
unsuccessful. The CAG noted that:
Other than execution of housing and urban infrastructure, it [the
JnNURM] was also intended to strengthen the urban local bodies
(ULBs) in terms of their structure, composition, financial resources,
functions and powers. . . . However in the selected States/UTs [Union
Territories], we observed that all the mandatory and optional reforms
were not implemented as per the commitments made in the
Memorandum of Agreement. Thus the objective of bringing about
reforms in institutional, financial and structural governance structure of
the ULBs to make them efficient, accountable and transparent could not
be achieved as has been envisaged.121

This article argues that the JnNURM did not achieve its ultimate goals in
large part because of larger constitutional challenges to decentralization
that persist today.
III. IMPEDIMENTS TO DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER TO
CITIES
The structure of India’s Constitution both promotes and impedes the
processes of decentralization and municipal empowerment. Political
decentralization has proven difficult because states can—but are not
required to —devolve power to municipalities under the 74th CAA. As a
result, states have not given as much authority to municipalities as the
drafters of the 74th CAA originally contemplated. India’s efforts at
administrative decentralization have been hindered by the municipalities’
lack of capacity and technical expertise, as well as competition with
entrenched parastatal agencies. Those barriers, in turn, have reduced the
states’ incentives to devolve power to municipalities. Fiscal decentralization has not occurred because financial responsibility, but not
revenue, has been devolved to municipalities. Although the JnNURM
harnessed national funds for urban renewal, these funds were channeled
through the states and, therefore, the outlays did not result in a
transformation of the fiscal federal system. The challenges to India’s

120. See Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 113 (noting the lack of attention to the poor “despite
a sub-mission dedicated to basic services of the urban poor” (internal parentheses omitted)).
121. Ramachandran, supra note 107.
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political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization efforts are explored in
the sub-sections that follow.122
A. Political Decentralization
The comparatively recent focus on empowering India’s cities is in
stark contrast with India’s history as a highly centralized federal system. As
argued below, this history is critical to understanding the challenges to
effectively decentralizing power to municipalities in India. Although the
74th CAA constitutionally recognized municipalities, it did not confer
independent political power to them. Rather, municipalities derive their
authority from the states—and the states must enact legislation to devolve
power to the municipalities. States were likely reluctant to decentralize
power to local bodies because of the states’ historically weak position visà-vis the national government.
1. States in India Have Historically Been Weak Vis-à-Vis the Central
Government
When India achieved independence from the British in 1947, the
drafters of the Indian Constitution believed that federalism could address
the need for political stability and help to transform the economy.123 Given
India’s diverse population and geographically concentrated minorities,
federalism’s potential to mitigate intrastate conflict made it particularly
attractive.124 Even prior to independence, India was moving in the direction
of federalism.125 The then-Princely States called for federalism in reaction

122. Political scientists Aaron Schneider and Daniel Treisman each establish a helpful framework
for conceptualizing decentralization. See Aaron Schneider, Decentralization: Conceptualization and
Measurement, 38 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 32, 32–56 (2003) (defining decentralization through three
core dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political); Daniel Treisman, Defining and Measuring
Decentralization: A Global Perspective (March 2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ssc
net.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/defin.pdf (dividing decentra-lization into a number of
different forms that are subsumed here into the term “political decentralization).
123. See generally RATH, supra note 12, at 34–35 (noting that the drafters hoped federalism would
reconcile conflicting groups in India and that although India adopted a federal system, “the word
‘federation’ or ‘federal’ occurs nowhere in the Constitution”).
124. See id. at 31–34 (noting that the Muslim community also believed that their rights would be
better protected under a federal government than under a unitary government); see also Nancy Bermeo,
A New Look at Federalism: The Import of Institutions, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 96, 97 (2002), http://
www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/stm103%20articles/bermeo_Federalism_conflict.pdf (finding
that rather than increasing ethnic conflict, federal systems may play a key role in helping ethnic groups
achieve peaceful political accommodation).
125. See Round Table Conference, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/510855/Round-Table-Conference (last visited Sept. 22, 2015) (noting that the
possibility of making India’s government a federal system was discussed at the Round Table
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to British rule. They perceived the British as having encroached upon their
power and were worried about the possibility that the central government
of India might one day be able to do the same.126
Although India’s national government is a de jure union government,
it is often considered to be a de facto central government because of the
strength of the national government compared to the state governments.127
Despite its linguistic, religious, and ethnic diversity, India is also
comparatively more centralized than other federal countries.128 India can be
described as a holding together federation; in contrast, the United States is
a coming together federation comprised of states that were autonomous
before uniting.129 While the decision to use the word “[u]nion” or “central”
to describe India’s national government may reflect user bias,130 the terms
“central government” or “the Center” are used throughout this article
because they are used in many national government reports.131
Several factors have contributed to the centralization of power in
India. India was founded as a “sovereign socialist . . . democratic
republic,”132 and, as a result, the central government played a strong role in
economic development during India’s first few decades as an independent

Conferences of 1930–32 and that these conferences then led to the development of the 1935
Government of India Act, which did in fact establish a federal system that was never used in practice).
126. See RATH, supra note 12, at 31 (noting how the Princes viewed federalism was a way “to
strengthen their position and secure some power in determining all-Indian policies”).
127. Chaubey, Federalism in India, supra note 16, at 1, 3, 5; see also RATH, supra note 12, at 18
(noting that the Indian system is “unitary” and “effective”).
128. See Shrawan K. Singh, Federal Transfers in India: An Introduction, in FISCAL FEDERALISM
IN INDIA, supra note 15, at 11, 14; See RATH, supra note 12, at 19 (noting that India is an asymmetric
federation, where linguistic, religious or linguistic cleavages can “coincid[e] with the sub-national
units”).
129. See RATH, supra note 12, at 55 (noting that India’s federalism and parliamentary system can
work against each other); Douglas V. Verney, Federalism, Federative Systems, and Federations: The
United States, Canada, and India, 25 PUBLIUS 81, 81, 83 (1995) (noting that the term “federalism” was
first articulated by the framers of the U.S. Constitution, and that federalism in India combines some of
these American ideals with the British parliamentary tradition).
130. See Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 44, n.1, 2 (arguing that referring
to the national government as the “Center” is extra-constitutional, if not unconstitutional, and also
noting that the term “state” in the Constitution has different meanings because it is used to refer to the
union government, the state governments, and also more generally to public entities).
131. See, e.g., B.K. CHATURVEDI, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RESTRUCTURING OF
CENTRALLY SPONSORED SCHEMES (CSS) 24 (2011), http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/
css/rep_css1710.pdf (noting that the JnNURM was a so-called “centrally sponsored scheme”);
MINISTRY OF FIN., AN ECONOMIC AND FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
BUDGET (2006–2007), http://finmin.nic.in/reports/FunClass200607.pdf; MINISTRY OF FIN., REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE FOR EVOLVING A COMPOSITE DEVELOPMENT INDEX OF STATES (2013), http://fin
min.nic.in/reports/Report CompDevState.pdf.
132. INDIA CONST. pmbl.
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country.133 The Constitution also gives the central government broad
authority compared to the states. For example, while a Proclamation of
Emergency is in effect, Article 250 allows the central legislature to make
laws with respect to matters in the State List.134 In addition, Article 353(b)
gives the central government the power to create laws on issues not
explicitly in the Union list.135 During an emergency, Article 354 gives the
president the power to suspend provisions relating to the transfer of
revenue from the Center to the states.136
The 1960s and 1970s, in particular, witnessed a strong consolidation
of power at the Center.137 Under Indira’s Gandhi initial term (1966–1977),
the Indian National Congress required Congress-led states to choose party
nominees for the position of State Chief Minister, and the central
government also committed itself to working to destabilize oppositioncontrolled state governments.138 In addition, Gandhi frequently invoked
Article 356 of the Constitution, which allows the central government to
take over the state when the state government is not “in accordance with
the provisions of this Constitution.”139 The central government further
strengthened its power during the State of Emergency declared between
1975 and 1977.140

133. T.V. Sathyamurthy, Impact of Centre-State Relations on Indian Politics: An Interpretative
Reckoning, 1947–87, 24 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2133, 2135–36 (1989). In the 1960s, the Indian
government became even more centralized as it tried to deal with the mass unrest that resulted from
increasing dissatisfaction with what had previously been the ruling party, the Congress Party. Id. It was
during this time that the Congress Party began to require Congress-led states to choose one of the
party’s nominees for the position of Chief Minister. Id. At this time, the Centre also committed itself to
working to destabilize opposition-control state governments. Id.; see also RATH, supra note 12, at 50
(“[P]oints of dispute [between the Centre and the States] began to raise their heads from the time of the
formulation of the Third Five-Year plan. They assumed greater magnitude as a result of the political
developments after 1964—after the death of Nehru, the economic difficulties of 1965 and 1966, the
interruption in planning, and the changing political situation, especially after the General Election in
1967.”).
134. INDIA CONST. art. 250.
135. INDIA CONST. art. 353(b).
136. M. GOVINDA RAO & NIRVIKAR SINGH, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERALISM IN INDIA 49
(2005).
137. G. RADHAKRISHNA KURUP, POLITICS OF CONGRESS FACTIONALISM IN KERALA SINCE 1982,
at 49, 52–53, 75 (2004). Indira Gandhi has been credited both for the split of the Congress Party in 1966
and the creation of the Janata Party. Gandhi contributed to the split of the Congress Party by choosing
her own candidate for President instead of the party nominated one. The Janata Party was later formed
by individuals who were outraged by the excessive centralization of Gandhi’s rule. Id.
138. Sathyamurthy, supra note 133, at 2136.
139. See INDIA CONST. art. 356 (outlining “provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery
in States”).
140. See, e.g., VIOLATION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN INDIA 196–98, 201 (A.R. Desai ed., 1986)
(noting that the central government further strengthened its power by making a number of changes to
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Although Gandhi’s Congress Party was replaced by the opposition
Janata Party in 1977, the trend towards centralization continued—and was
even exacerbated.141 While the central government had previously taken
over states by declaring “President’s Rule,” the Janata government went
further, seeking to dissolve all the state assemblies at once.142 The central
government had so much power that it was referred to as a unique “hybrid
of a federal and unitary constitutional structure”143 or “quasi-federal.”144 As
these political dynamics illustrate, “the federal process is very difficult to
achieve in countries where the federal principle is combined with a
parliamentary system of government for it is generally accepted that the
two systems work almost in opposite directions—federalism tends to
diffuse power whereas a parliamentary system tends to concentrate
power.”145
This excessive centralization was met with growing calls for greater
state autonomy and even secession.146 As a result, several commissions
were constituted to study center-state relations, but it is not clear whether
they have had any substantive impact. For example, a committee was
constituted in 1969 during Gandhi’s first term to study state autonomy and
center-state relations under the chairmanship of P.V. Rajmannar, but the
ultimate recommendations were ignored by the Center.147 In 1984, Gandhi,

the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), which involved progressively stripping political
prisoners and other detainees of their rights); UJJWAL KUMAR SINGH, THE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND
ANTI-TERROR LAWS IN INDIA 65 (2007) (discussing how the National Emergency of 1975 allowed
MISA to assume “formidable proportions”).
141. See RATH, supra note 12, at 75–76 (noting how the Center proposed dissolution of several
State Assemblies in 1977).
142. Id. at 76; see also MIKHAIL FILIPPOV ET AL., DESIGNING FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELFSUSTAINABLE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 214 n.28 (2004) (noting that India’s federalism is not “market
preserving” due to a lack of “credible commitment to limiting the role of the center in economic
regulation”).
143. Vasuki Nesiah, Federalism and Diversity in India, in AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY:
NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES 53, 54 (Yash Ghai ed., 2000).
144. Aiyar, supra note 5, at 115. But see Ramachandran, supra note 5, at 58 (taking issue with the
use of the term “quasi-federal” on the basis that it suggests that the Indian system is based on an
underlying idea that is “not federal,” which he does not believe is the case).
145. Rath, supra note 12, at 55.
146. See id. at 72 (“The States demanded more autonomy by flaunting threats of secession.”); B.D.
DUA, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IN INDIA, IN INDIAN FEDERALISM IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 131 (2003).
147. RATH, supra note 12, at 39–40 (noting that the committee, which was constituted in 1969,
recommended the omission of Articles 256, 257, and 339(2) of India’s constitution, which would have
significantly reduced the control over the States by the Union and increased state autonomy); Indira
Ghandi: Prime Minister of India, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/biography/
Indira-Gandhi (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (stating that Indira Gandhi initially became Prime Minister in
1966, leaving that office in 1977).
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in her second term as Prime Minister, commissioned Supreme Court Justice
Rajinder Sarkaria to lead a committee examining the state of center-state
relations. Yet despite its length, the final report produced by the Sarkaria
Commission suggested little in the way of structural reform.148 Instead, it
focused more on the stabilization of center-state relations. Some believed
the Sarkaria Commission to be a political maneuver by Indira Gandhi so
she could seem to be responding to the concerns of regional actors.149 The
Sarkaria Commission’s ultimate lack of “claws” also demonstrated the
difficulty of translating political will alone into meaningful change.
While the Sarkaria Commission focused on the stabilization of centerstate relations, it also made several recommendations that would have
strengthened the position of the states vis-à-vis the central government.
This specific subset of recommendations attempted to confer more power
on the states and state leaders and to protect the states from negative
interference by the central government. For example, the Commission
recommended that all residual powers, except those related to taxation, go
to the Concurrent List.150 The Commission also tried to protect the state
governments from central interference by prescribing restraint in the central
government’s use of Article 356 of the Constitution.151 Finally, the
Commission tried to limit gubernatorial manipulation by the Center by
recommending that state governors not come from the Center’s ruling
party.152 While, as a whole, the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations
served to reinforce the status-quo in center-state relations, there was a
specific group of provisions that—if implemented—could have greatly
strengthened the position of the states.
Although few of the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations were
implemented, the late 1980s saw a major breakthrough in the movement
towards greater decentralization.153 In 1989, for the first time, the Indian
Parliament reviewed a set of legislative bills, known as the 64th and 65th
Amendments, designed to give the panchayats and municipalities
constitutional status. At that time, then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was
likely looking to check the power of state leaders as the Congress Party had

148. Amal Ray, The Sarkaria Commission’s Perspective: An Appraisal, 23 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
1131, 1131 (1988).
149. Lawrence Saez, The Sarkaria Commission and India’s Struggle for Federalism, 8 CONTEMP.
S. ASIA 41, 42 (1999).
150. SARKARIA COMMISSION REPORT ¶¶ 2.4.03, 2.6.16 (1988), http://www.gangothri.org/node/74.
151. Id. ¶ 3.5.23.
152. See id. ¶ 4.6.09 (stating that the governor should be from “outside the State”).
153. See generally SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 24 (describing the dynamics of
decentralization in India over numerous decades).
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just lost control in a number of states.154 This was also a time when the
unity of the Indian state was being questioned. As separatists in central
India and Uttar Pradesh gained strength, it became clear that some power
needed to be devolved to keep the union intact.155 “[A]s the states gained
more bargaining power in the 1980s, the Center may have looked to
stronger local governments as a counterweight.”156 Gandhi’s political
inexperience combined with the political exigencies of the time allowed
him to take a fairly radical step forward towards local democracy.157
While the 64th and 65th Amendments failed in the Rajya Sabha,
movement towards greater decentralization continued in the 1990s. In
1990, the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendation for the creation of an
Inter-State Council (ISC) was implemented.158 The ISC was charged with
reviewing the other recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission.159 In
particular, the Council accepted the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendation that when making legislation on items in the Concurrent List,
the central government should consult with the state governments.160 While
little attention was given to the Sarkaria Commission recommendations in
the first two years after they were issued, the creation of the ISC
represented a positive step forward. The creation of the ISC was important
not only because it meant that one of the Commission’s recommendations
was being realized, but also because it provided a forum for continuing
debate on the rest of the recommendations made by the Sarkaria
Commission.

154. D. Bandyopadhyay et al., Dependency vs Autonomy: The Identity Crisis of India’s
Panchayats, in GRASS-ROOTS DEMOCRACY IN INDIA AND CHINA: THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE 53, 63
(Manoranjan Mohanty et al. eds., 2007).
155. Bandyopadhyay et al., supra note 154, at 63.
156. RAO & SINGH, supra note 136, at 61; see also CRISPIN BATES & SUBHO BASU, RETHINKING
INDIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 186–89 (2005) (noting that the next major piece of legislation that
focused on local government was the 64th Constitutional Amendment, but the bill ironically did not
pass because it was perceived as a ploy by the Indian National Congress to expand the role of the
Center); B.K. Chandrashekar, Panchayati Raj Bill: The Real Flaw, 24 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1433, 1433
(1989) (drawing attention to the 1978 Asok Mehta report, which stated that panchayati raj institutions
should be established, and that they “could be empowered by the state legislature with executive and
administrative functions”).
157. Bandyopadhyay et al., supra note 154, at 62.
158. HAMID HUSSAIN, INDIAN FEDERALISM: EMERGING TRENDS 28–30 (2010).
159. LAWRENCE SÁEZ, FEDERALISM WITHOUT A CENTRE: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORM ON INDIA’S FEDERAL SYSTEM 126–27 (2002) (noting that between 1991 and 1993
the ISC developed recommendations related to 179 of the Sarkaria Commissions 247 proposals, and
that the ISC recommended implementing 130 of the Commission’s recommendations as they were
originally written, slightly modifying twenty-five of these recommendations, and not implementing
twenty-four of the Commission’s recommendations).
160. Id. at 127.
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In 1992, with the passage of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional
Amendment Acts, panchayats and municipalities were given constitutional
status for the first time in India’s history. The draft version of these two
amendments came out of an extended discussion led by then Prime
Minister V. P. Singh at the June Conference of Chief Ministers.161 The 73rd
and 74th Amendments were structured in a very similar manner to the
proposed 64th and 65th Amendments. The 73rd Amendment, like the 64th
Amendment, focused on the devolution of power down to the panchayats
while the 74th Amendment, like the 65th Amendment, pertained to the
devolution of power down to urban local bodies. The main difference
between them is that the 73rd and 74th Amendments devolved more power
to the states. The writers of the 73rd and 74th Amendments appeared
cognizant of the fact that one of the main reasons the 64th and 65th
Amendments were defeated is that they were seen as a ploy by the Center
to bypass the states. Motivated by this concern, the authors of the 73rd and
74th Amendments took pains to identify areas where power could remain
with the states and areas where the panchayats and municipalities could be
empowered to function as units of self-government.162 This work paid off
and the 73rd and 74th CAAs were passed. After a decades-long push for
greater political decentralization, India had finally created a constitutionally
enshrined third tier of government.163
However, the 73rd and 74th Amendments were not without
weaknesses. While Article 243Q of the Constitution states that
municipalities should be created in every state, it is followed by a proviso
stating that municipalities do not have to be created in urban areas
designated as industrial townships.164 Critics claim that this proviso goes
against the basic spirit of the 74th Amendment,165 and as the number of
industrial townships or Special Economic Zones has grown since 2005, this
proviso has gained greater salience.

161. SHRIRAM MAHESHWARI, THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE YEAR BOOK: 1990, at 222 (1990). A
fierce debate occurred at the June Conference of Chief Ministers over the devolution of power. There
were two subjects in particular on which the ministers present at this conference did not agree. The first
was the role that State Finance Commissions should play in monitoring local financing. The second was
how general elections should be held. Id.
162. See generally SWETA MISHRA, DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA: STUDY IN
RETROSPECT & PROSPECT 82–97 (1994).
163. See id. (noting that one of the main differences between these two bills is that a number of the
different powers that were to be assigned to the Center in the 64th and 65th amendment would now be
assigned to the state legislatures).
164. INDIA CONST. art. 243Q.
165. K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, The Devolution Deficit, INDIAN EXPRESS (May 1, 2013), http://
archive.indianexpress.com/news/the-devolution-deficit/1109816/.
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After the passage of the 73rd and 74th CAAs, several factors led to an
improvement in the position of the states vis-à-vis the central
government.166 Thanks to economic liberalization, state-level regulation
assumed new importance as pressure mounted for less regulation at the
national level. The 1990s also saw new coalitions form between national
and regional parties as national parties struggled to win an outright majority
in the national polls.167 Because many leaders of regional parties were also
state leaders, this development indirectly increased the power of the states.
The last factor that contributed to the growing influence of the states post1992 is the S.R. Bommai v. Union of India ruling of 1994.168 In this seminal
case, the Supreme Court placed limitations on the President’s ability to use
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution to dismiss state governments.169 As a
result of these key economic, political, and legal developments, the power
of the states increased in the 1990s, which limited the centralizing
tendencies in India to a degree.170 However, even with these reforms, India
is still a highly centralized federal country.
The recent election calls into question the trend toward state-oriented
power. In May 2014, the BJP, a national party, won the highest number of
seats by a single party in what is now being described as the “post-regional
politics era.”171 With 282 out of 543 seats, the BJP successfully formed a
government without a coalition, “a feat that no party has come close to

166. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that states
were devolved greater power due to the “rise of regional parties and coalition governments at the State
and Union levels, greater economic liberalisation reducing State control and diminishing the importance
of State investment in commercial undertakings, a very healthy tradition of fair non-discriminatory
fiscal devolution through various mechanisms and compulsions of economic growth engendering a
healthy competition for investment”); see also Aseema Sinha, The Changing Political Economy of
Federalism in India: A Historical Institutionalist Approach, 3 INDIA REV. 25, 26 (2004) (explaining that
the nature of competition for states in India transitioned from vertical competition (for resources from
the Center) to horizontal competition (states competing with each other)).
167. See Milan Vaishnav, The Complicated Rise of India’s Regional Parties, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, (Nov. 13, 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/13/
complicated-rise-of-india-s-regional-parties/gtph (indicating that due to the rise of regional parties, it
has become unimaginable for one single party to control the Indian government).
168. See generally S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 644 (India).
169. M.P. Singh, Towards a More Federalized Parliamentary System in India: Explaining
Functional Change, 74 PAC. AFF. 553, 565-66, 558 (2001). The case arose because in 1991, the then
Governor of Tamil Nadu refused to officially recommend the dismissal of his government when asked
to do so by the central government. Historically, when the central government indicated that a governor
needed to recommend the dismissal of their government the governors did so without question because
of their close ties to the central government. Id.
170. See HUSSAIN, supra note 158, at 81–91 (noting an era of coalition governments after 1989
that often contained regional parties).
171. S. Rukmini, How the BJP Won this Election, HINDU (May 18, 2014), http://www.the
hindu.com/news/national/how-the-bjp-won-this-election/article6020712.ece.
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since the 1984 election which saw a wave of sympathy following the
assassination of Congress Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.”172 Indeed, this is
the first time in Indian history that any single party secured more votes than
the Congress Party.173 Although the new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi,
rose to power as the leader of the state of Gujarat, he has an “authoritarian”
leadership style because “[b]y instinct [he] centralises power.”174 A
spowerful Prime Minister’s office could make it difficult for Modi to
provide a greater role for states in policymaking.175
2. Cities Derive Their Power from the State
India’s history as a highly centralized country and the ongoing
struggle by states for greater power provides important context for
understanding the challenges to municipal decentralization in India. After
the passage of the 74th Constitutional Amendment, the transfer of power
and funds to municipalities has been nominal in most states.176 Significant
variation exists in the extent to which states have devolved authority to
municipalities.177 This reflects one of the challenges of decentralization in a
federal country where the central government does not have a direct
relationship with the municipal level. Instead, the local government is
completely under the authority of the state government.178 Uniformity of
172. Id. But see Adam Ziegfeld, India’s Election Isn’t as Historic as People Think, WASH. POST
(May 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/16/indias-electionisnt-as-historic-as-people-think/. While described as a political landslide, the BJP in fact only gained
approximately 31% of the vote. Like the U.S., India has a single-member district (SMD) electoral
system, which means that votes do not necessarily translate proportionally into seats. Id.
173. See Narendra Modi, Promising the Good Times, ECONOMIST (May 24, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21602710-overwhelming-election-victory-promises-reshapeindian-politics-promising-good-times (“Mr Modi’s victory has disproved an article of political faith
from the past three decades: that India’s messy democracy, cursed by strong regional and caste-based
parties, could produce only fragmented outcomes and weak coalition governments. This, the clearest
result since 1984, should mean stable, decisive and predictable rule. Mr Modi, not one to hold back,
hints at being in office for a decade or more.”).
174. Id.
175. See Ziegfeld, supra note 172 (“Moving forward, the implications of this election for policy
may be profound. A return to single-party majority government for the first time in 25 years and a BJPled government unfettered by the demands of coalition partners may well produce policy changes
unlike anything we have seen before in India.”); Vaishnav, supra note 167 (identifying trends that
suggest that “regional parties may not be the juggernauts many observers make them out to be”).
176. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii.
177. See HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 87 (“The [74th Constitutional] Amendment is even less
clear on the devolution of finances . . . leaving it to the discretion of state legislatures. State
governments have only partially complied with devolution, and this has typically not been accompanied
by the devolution of funds and functionaries.”); Mohanty, supra note 29, at 123–24 (“[W]ide
differences exist between states on the assignment of functions to municipalities.”).
178. Political Decentralization, THE WORLD BANK GRP., http://www1.worldbank.org/public
sector/decentralization/political.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (noting that in a federal system such as
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state and local-level reforms would be very difficult to achieve in any
federal system, but the enormous economic and social variation between
Indian states and Union Territories compounds this challenge immensely.
The biggest challenge for decentralization in India is that the process
requires the active participation and consent of states.179 There are differing
views on the proper balance of power between the states and the
municipalities, and in some instances, the central government has
overstated the mandate to decentralize.180 For example, the Planning
Commission of India, in its Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017), stated,
“Despite the 74th Constitutional Amendment, which required States to
transfer eighteen functions to the ULBs, there is significant variation in
devolution of functions, functionaries and funds across the States.”181 The
Planning Commission has since been replaced by the National Institution
for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog,182 but the Five Year Plan still
provides valuable insight into the goals of the JnNURM. In fact, states are
not required to devolve authority; rather, it is discretionary.183 Indeed,
many states have interpreted the provision of Article 243W relating to the
powers of local authorities as advisory only.184 Because implementation is
essentially optional, neither states nor municipalities are expressly
penalized for failure to implement decentralization goals.185 Yet, at the

India, the federal government is “limited in the relationships it may establish with the local level and
must seek to affect local behavior and outcomes through the states/provinces”).
179. See THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 159 (indicating that changes
requiring “consent and active support of State Governments . . . can . . . be implemented only in the
medium term”).
180. See, e.g., SÁEZ, supra note 159, at 140–42 (explaining that several scholars, including K.C.
Wheare, believed that India represents a form of cooperative federalism in which federal and regional
governments are interdependent while others believed that the two levels of government in a federal
system should be independent); Modi Strikes Non-Partisan Note, Says Will Take Opposition Along,
TIMES INDIA (June 12, 2014), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Modi-strikes-non-partisan-notesays-will-take-opposition-along/articleshow/36413945.cms (drawing attention to Modi’s recent use of
the term cooperative federalism and explaining that Modi has been using this term to indicate that he
wants the central government to forge a better working relationship with the states).
181. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 324 (emphasis added).
182. Cabinet Secretariat Resolution, 2015, No. 511/2/1/2015 Gazette of India, pt. I sec. 1 (Jan. 1,
2015); Manmohan Singh Faults Modi Govt for Abolishing Planning Commission, ECON. TIMES (June 9,
2015),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/manmohan-singh-faults-modigovt-for-abolishing-planning-commission/articleshow/47600859.cms [hereinafter Singh Faults Modi];
NITI Aayog Website Likely to be up on Monday, ECON. TIMES (May 15, 2015), http://articles.economic
times.indiatimes.com/2015-05-15/news/62192345_1_niti-aayog-the-aayog-transforming-india
[hereinafter NITI Aayog].
183. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 9–10.
184. Id. at 22.
185. Shatkin & Vidyarthi, supra note 22, at 10; see also S.N. Datye, Panchayati Raj in
Maharashtra State, in DYNAMICS OF NEW PANCHAYATI RAJ SYSTEM IN INDIA: SELECT STATES 1, 26
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same time, the lack of a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities also
leads to confusion and, at times, interference by the state with what at least
some commentators believe are urban affairs.186 There have also been calls
to amend the Constitution to require state governments to vest power in
local authorities and to expand the responsibilities of urban local bodies to
make them commensurate with those of the rural local bodies.187
Given this constitutional structure, the central government must work
through the states to promote decentralization.188 Through the JnNURM,
the central government incentivized compliance with the 74th CAA by
promising funding for infrastructure and basic services.189 The scheme
represents “the first time that the central government is providing
assistance of this kind for what is classified as a State subject as per the
Constitution.”190
This analysis suggests that the potential for effective decentralization
is limited by both India’s constitutional structure and by the language of the
provisions authorized by the 74th CAA. Municipalities are not endowed
with significant independent power; rather, they must wait for such power
to be devolved to them by the states. As a result, states have been reluctant
to devolve power to the local level out of fear that it will exacerbate their
already subordinate position vis-à-vis the central government. Moreover, as
detailed in the next two sections, states do not want to give power to
municipalities that lack the capacity and the financial resources to
effectively carry out the functions listed in the Twelfth Schedule of the
Indian Constitution. In other words, the failure to decentralize

(Ganapathy Palanithurai ed., 2002) (noting that despite the passage of the 73rd and 74th Amendments
“even today Panchayats are not vested with power to initiate plan[s] at the district level”).
186. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 16 (also noting that
infrequent elections have hampered the functioning of Indian municipalities); GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND
ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 11–12 (“While there may be rationale for retention of
some establishments of the State Government including that of the district administration at the local
level, their functions and responsibilities should be confined to areas which are outside the jurisdiction
of the local bodies. In respect of devolved functions, local government institutions should have
autonomy and must be free of the State Governments’ bureaucratic control.”); Kennedy & Zerah, supra
note 71, at 112 (noting that the role of the state government in urban affairs remains central).
187. THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 158; GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN.
REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at i.
188. But see Bandyopadhyay et al., supra note 154, at 63 (observing that while Centrally
Sponsored Schemes were historically implemented by the states, at this time, Rajiv Gandhi’s
government began to bypass the states and reach out to state and local governments directly to help with
the implementation of CSS).
189. JNNURM OVERVIEW 3, supra note 74, at 3–4; see also Das, supra note 40, at 116 (“The
JNNURM hinges on a carrot-and-stick approach, providing federal funds to select cities conditional
upon their agreement to undertake governance reform to become efficient and self-sustaining.”).
190. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 253.
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administratively and fiscally negatively impacts the impetus for political
decentralization; but many would argue that unless municipalities gain
political authority over these functions, they will never have the
administrative or financial mandate they need to succeed.
B. Administrative Decentralization
This article argues that the poor capacity of municipalities to assume
the functions identified in the 74th CAA and Twelfth Schedule has been a
major stumbling block to achieving the goals of decentralization and the
JnNURM.191 The limited administrative capacity of local bodies has not
only hampered administrative decentralization, it has also discouraged
states from transferring political and fiscal authority, creating a Catch-22
situation.
Local bodies have generally been unable to provide basic services to
their populations.192 While the country arguably lacks capacity at all levels
of government, this deficit is particularly acute at the local level.193 Most
municipalities do not have the specialized and technical skills or staff to
oversee the functions to be devolved.194 For example, a 2011 assessment
found that most municipalities lack the ability to take over functions such
as roads, bridges, water supply, sewerage, drainage and urban forestry.195
The JnNURM sought to foster administrative decentralization by
incentivizing reforms that promoted channels for greater participation in
the planning process. For example, it encouraged the development of the

191. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 24 (“[T]he matters
listed in the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules could not be fully handled by the local governments even
in the best of circumstances.”); NAT’L INST. FOR URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 92, at ix (“It can be
argued that, barring exceptional cases, local bodies neither have the technical competence nor
information base to take decisions with regard to location of industrial unit, its technology and
production links. These do not have the capability to assess the long-term cost implications of the
contractual arrangements they are entering into with private companies, for the people or urban
economy.”); WORLD BANK, ENHANCING WATER SERVICE THROUGH PERFORMANCE AGREEMENTS 2
(2009) (“Although the 74th Amendment to the Constitution of India has made urban local bodies
responsible for [water supply and sanitation] services, the water departments of these bodies continue to
depend extensively on central and state governments for technical and operational direction.”);
THORNTON, supra note 103, at 84.
192. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 10.
193. Ahluwalia, supra note 108, at 51 (“A state-level municipal cadre is extremely important in
driving the process of planning, project preparation and implementation, and city management.”).
194. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 266–69 (noting that municipalities need experts in law, project
management, finance, social development, e-governance, public works, engineering, urban planning,
physical planning, transport, and accounting).
195. Id. at 258; see also ATAL MISSION, supra note 113, at 9 (noting that the Atal Mission for
Rejuvenation an Urban Transformation hopes to change all this by providing more professional training
for municipal workers).
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Metropolitan Planning Committees and the District Planning
Committees,196 as well as Metropolitan/City Development Commissions.197
The scheme stressed the need for more robust and comprehensive planning
that has at least a ten-year perspective. It also urged state and local
authorities to reassess the boundaries of municipalities as peri-urban areas
continue to grow.198 While certain provisions were complied with, such as
the creation of three tiers of local government, many of the planningrelated committees have not yet been formed.199
Capacity building has been described as the “single most important
activity required in the today’s urban sector scenario.”200 The JnNURM
promoted capacity building efforts by providing project funding tied to
74th CAA reforms.201 To the extent that capacity building took place, it
was short-term and generally limited to higher-level officials, such as the
Mayor, while lower-level officials, such as the engineers responsible for
implementation, were excluded.202 Funds earmarked for other trainings
were not utilized because suitable staff members were not available.203
Tensions have arisen because state-level agencies known as
“parastatals” are often better equipped than municipalities to handle certain
functions. This situation highlights a potential conflict between the goal of
improving access to basic services and the devolution of power.
Historically, many public services and city planning functions were
performed by parastatals, such as development authorities, housing boards,
slum development agencies, and water and sanitation boards, many of
which were created in the 1970s and 1980s.204 These semi-autonomous

196. Ahluwalia, supra note 108, at 51.
197. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 322–24; see also
Sivaramakrishnan, supra note 37, at 105–30 (discussing district planning reforms).
198. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 327–28.
199. NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at vi (noting that “while there has been full
compliance in respect of provisions, such as constitution of three types of ULBs, reservation of seats,
and constitution of SFCs, the same cannot be said for other provisions, namely constitution of Wards
Committees, District Planning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees”).
200. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 257; see also GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS
COMM’N, supra note 2, at 69 (noting that capacity building incorporates both organizational
development and individual development).
201. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 68–69.
202. Id. at 68; THORNTON, supra note 103, at 267.
203. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 334 (In recognizing these
challenges, the Planning Commission recommended that the second phase of the JnNURM reserve
approximately ten percent of its overall funds to a separate sub-mission for capacity building.);
THORNTON, supra note 103, at 257.
204. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 9–10; THORNTON,
supra note 103, at 256.
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state agencies have specialized expertise.205 Sometimes described as
agencies or public corporations, parastatals usually have a corporate
structure similar to publicly traded private sector companies and a separate
legal status from other public service providers.206 The “corporatization” of
public services has been widely encouraged as an efficient way to manage
the delivery of public services because it reduces the potential for political
interference and heightens the role of technical experts.207
Some parastatals may also be “ring-fenced,” meaning that that their
budgets are managed separately from the rest of the municipality or state.
This strategy, which was encouraged by the High Powered Expert
Committee on Urban Infrastructure and the now-defunct Planning
Commission of India208 (replaced with NITI Aayog by Prime Minister
Modi in 2015209), is designed to “create greater financial transparency,
reduce political interference, and strengthen managerial accountability
within relatively autonomous service entities.”210 This administrative and
political isolation also facilitates raising tariffs for user charges.211
However, “ring-fencing” has also been critiqued because some public
services should arguably be provided for the safety and health of the
community, even though they may not be financially sustainable. Indeed,
the strategy can make it more difficult to provide affordable services to the
poor and marginalized by preventing cross-subsidization across different
sectors.212

205. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 10; DAVID
MCDONALD, RETHINKING CORPORATIZATION AND PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1 (2014),
http://www.municipalservicesproject.org/userfiles/McDonald_Chap1_Public_Ambiguity_and_the_Mult
iple_Meanings_of_Corporatization.pdf.
206. MCDONALD, supra note 205, at 1.
207. See Id. (“Water and electricity utilities are common examples, although the practice extends
to a much wider range of goods and services, including airports, childcare, universities, forests,
hospitals, transport and manufacturing.”).
208. See HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 98 (providing support for the claim that ring-fencing
and corporatization in general can lead to significant efficiency gains); TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 333 (encouraging that proceeds accruing to ULBs be set up in a city
development fund and “ring-fenced” off for other urban infrastructure projects and for shelter).
209. Cabinet Secretariat Resolution, supra note 182, pt. I sec. 1; Singh Faults Modi, supra note
182; NITI Aayog, supra note 182.
210. MCDONALD, supra note 205, at 2.
211. See TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 332 (encouraging the
adoption of tariff structures that “not only cover O&M costs, debt servicing costs and depreciation, but
also provide a minimal profit to the ULBs to facilitate creation of an equity base for ULBs over time”).
212. See, e.g., DAVID A. MCDONALD, THE BELL TOLLS FOR THEE: COST RECOVERY, CUTOFFS,
AND THE AFFORDABILITY OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES IN SOUTH AFRICA 7 (2002), ftp://healthlink.org.za/
pubs/localgov/ mspreport.pdf; Sharmila Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History,
Meaning and the Controversy over Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 135 (2013).
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The critical factor for the purposes of this analysis is that parastatals
are state-level agencies that are often better positioned to provide services
than city-level agencies. Yet, as K.C. Sivaramakrishnan argues, “It is
conveniently forgotten that the functional domain of the [urban local
bodies] have been steadily undermined by the state governments by setting
up parastatals and diverting municipal functions and funds to them.”213
The challenges of achieving administrative decentralization highlight
an inherent conflict that was at the heart of the JnNURM: cities may not yet
be in a position to improve infrastructure and basic services. In other
words, realizing the 74th CAA’s goal of municipal empowerment requires
a long-term commitment; but, in the interim, the devolution of power to
cities could actually hinder the expansion of infrastructure and basic
services. The JnNURM attempted to navigate this conflict and strike a
balance by permitting the interim use of parastatals.214 In addition, many
municipalities relied on external consultants to develop the various plans
needed to seek and implement JnNURM project-funding.
However, many have criticized such reliance on parastatals because it
is perceived as detracting from the goal of municipal empowerment at the
core of the 74th CAA.215 For example, one national government report on
decentralization in India stated, “development authorities should be
dissolved and their functions taken over by the local bodies in whose
jurisdiction they operate.”216 The reliance on parastatals could reduce the
potential for participatory decision-making by deferring to technical
experts who are only indirectly accountable to the people.217 Many
proponents of decentralization in India see the rise of these parastatal
agencies as having a negative effect on local bodies, weakening them and
facilitating their “atrophy.”218 There is an effort in some quarters of the

213. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37, at 94–95.
214. See id. at 94 (noting that the JnNURM “guidelines equate parastatal organizations with an
elected local body”); TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 326 (seeing a role for
parastatals in a variety of sectors including water supply, solid waste management, sewerage, sanitation,
primary health services, primary education, roads and urban transport).
215. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 326; see also Chaubey,
Federalism in India, supra note 16, at 5 (suggesting that given the constitutional and political emphasis
on decentralization, the role of parastatals, such as state-level authorities, public corporations and other
boards, is unclear).
216. THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 161, 182 (“It is desirable that all funds
relating to local governments be routed through the local bodies and not through any statutory or nonstatutory body whose activities overlap with theirs. All such parallel bodies may be abolished so that
funds flow directly to the local bodies through the State Governments.”).
217. See HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 63 (noting that parastatals are also only indirectly
accountable to ULBs).
218. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 10.
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Indian government to reverse the “massive decline in the role and status of
local bodies” that arose as a result of the parastatals.219 Even former Prime
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh urged state governments in 2007 to
empower district level institutions, as opposed to state-level parastatals, to
handle basic services like water supply.220 A seminal report by the Second
Administrative Reforms Commission of the Government of India stated:
[T]he parastatal bodies function totally independent from the local
governments and are directly accountable to the State Government.
Thus, the local governments are often divested of their important
functions. Such proliferation of parastatals runs counter to the principle
of subsidiarity and precludes effective citizens’ participation in the
management of these services. The citizen is compelled to deal with a
multiplicity of authorities to access even the basic amenities and
services. The local functions of all these authorities therefore need to
devolve on local governments. . . .221

This critique of parastatals highlights the limits of the 74th CAA to
India’s Constitution. As discussed supra, the 74th CAA did not mandate
the devolution of power from states to local bodies. A municipality’s
ability to take over administrative functions has impacted state decisions
about whether to devolve power. The use of semi-autonomous agencies
with discretion is a form of administrative decentralization often referred to
as delegation.222 This was the type of decentralization promoted in the
1970s and 1980s in India to improve public management. In contrast, the
transfer of authority for decision-making, finance, and management to
lower tiers of government is usually described as devolution.223 This type
of administrative decentralization is usually the basis for political
decentralization because it provides greater opportunity for citizens and
their elected representatives to exert power over public decision-making.224
The Modi administration is replacing the JnNURM with its own
programs and it has already substituted the Planning Commission with the

219. Id. at iii.
220. See id. at 11 (“I therefore request State Governments to consider empowering district level
institutional structures to handle the issue of water supply. This is also a constitutional obligation as
water supply is one of the basic functions to be carried out by rural and urban local bodies as per the
11th Schedule of our Constitution.”).
221. Id. at 19.
222. Administrative Decentralization, THE WORLD BANK GRP., http://www1.worldbank.org/public
sector/decentralization/admin.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
223. Id.
224. Id.
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NITI
Aayog.225
Nevertheless,
the
Planning
Commission’s
recommendations for the next phase of the JnNURM are still worth
considering because many of the central ideas remain, albeit repackaged.226 The tremendously overlapping responsibilities of state and
city-level institutions in India have resulted in a “mazelike structure of
management and accountability.”227 The former Planning Commission
stressed the need for greater deliberative processes at the local level to
institutionalize participatory and accountability mechanisms.228 It also
suggested a stronger harmonization of parastatals with the elected
municipal bodies by encouraging the two bodies to enter into suitable
memoranda of understanding, with clearly specified and mutually agreed
upon parameters and deliverables.229 This type of arrangement is likely
preferable to giving the municipalities responsibility at the eleventh hour,
especially since the service delivery capacities of municipalities are not
always identified before powers are devolved.230 This approach would also
enable cities to tap into the technical expertise of parastatals, which have a
degree of operational autonomy, while simultaneously ensuring a degree of
public accountability.231 Another option is for local bodies to maintain a
common pool of such expertise that could be accessed on demand and by
payment.232 By providing more accountability to elected municipal
officials, this type of arrangement would at least help achieve the spirit of
the 74th CAA reforms.233
225. Singh Faults Modi, supra note 182; NITI Aayog, supra note 182.
226. See TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 28, 325 (citing reforms of the
High Powered Expert Committee for Urban Infrastructure); HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 94 (noting
that the JnNURM is administered by both the Ministry of Urban Development and the Ministry of
Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, and that the merger of these two ministries is “a prerequisite
for taking the agenda of better urban governance forward”).
227. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 324; see also THORNTON, supra
note 103, at 258 (noting instances under the JnNURM where new housing construction was not tied to
infrastructure or basic service delivery); HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 63 (drawing attention to the
tortuous accountability system that exists in the field of urban transport).
228. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 326.
229. See THORNTON, supra note 103, at 266 (“For the devolution of functions under 74th CAA,
there should be a tripartite agreement between the ULB and parastatal agency to make the ULB
accountable for the city functions.”).
230. Id. at 257 (noting how “using the structure followed by states like Orissa, [memoranda of
agreement] should be signed with the parastatal agencies to permit them to implement the projects with
them being accountable to the ULB for the same”).
231. HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 63 (noting that currently “the accountability of parastatals is
to state government and not to ULBs and thus the latter have little control over the parastatals”);
TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 325–26; World Bank, supra note 191, at 2.
232. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 72.
233. Id. at 30–31 (suggesting that the creation of district councils should be accompanied by a
change in the responsibilities of the district collector who would be in charge of a wide range of duties
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Any new urban renewal program in India should also be mindful of
the challenges that JnNURM faced. The JnNURM required six mandatory
reforms at the state level and seven reforms at the municipal level. It also
included another ten optional reforms. Failure to achieve these reforms
impacted funding for projects and, in some instances, led to cost-overruns
and delays.234 But weak initial capacity prevented states from devolving
power and implementing the reforms in the first place. Thus, before
requiring that certain powers necessarily be devolved from the state to the
city level, the central government should consider having consultations
with the states about what is feasible.235 As part of this process, the capacity
of the municipalities needs to be assessed. If a city is not yet prepared to
assume full responsibility, then the state ought to prioritize ensuring that
municipalities are engaged in the process by which parastatal agencies
deliver services to citizens. 236
Effective forms of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization
are intimately interrelated. If municipalities lack the capacity to take up
functions envisioned under the 74th CAA, there is reluctance for states to
devolve power to them. A municipality’s financial position is weakened
when it is not able to accrue land-based revenues and financing options that
otherwise go to development authorities and parastatals.237 But
municipalities may not be motivated to assume these functions unless
appropriate power and finances are available.238 A 2011 evaluation of the
JnNURM found that because capacity-building funds were under-utilized
during the six year project-span, it was untenable for states to blame
municipalities for their lack of capacity.239
In some cases, the states may actually work to keep urban local
government from functioning efficiently. Typically, the state government
assesses the number of people from the backward castes that live in
different districts.240 This number is important because it influences how
many seats in the local government will be reserved for members of the

that extend from land acquisition and assessment to maintenance of law and order in both rural and
urban areas of a particular district); THORNTON, supra note 103, at 267.
234. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 256.
235. Id. at 261.
236. JNNURM OVERVIEW 3, supra note 74, at 12.
237. THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 171–72.
238. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 81.
239. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 259.
240. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 34.
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backward castes. In many cases, states have not shared this information,
rendering it impossible for local governments to hold elections.241
Another impediment to effective administrative decentralization is the
lack of coordination between urban and rural governments. This disconnect
is partly attributable to the fact that a system of rural local governance was
created before a system of urban governance.242 In addition, the rise of new
peri-urban areas has made it harder to distinguish areas as clearly urban or
rural.243 States have also found it difficult to devolve planning powers to
local governments when the planning area is larger than city limits. For
example, a planning district could cover several municipalities and/or rural
areas.244 Better coordination between urban and rural local governments is
needed because of the expanding peri-urban landscape.245
The 74th CAA paved the way for political decentralization, but placed
significant discretion at the state level. If municipalities are not
administratively capable, then states will have even less incentive to
devolve powers to them. The capacity of municipalities to take on
increased responsibilities is further impacted by the constitutional
limitations on fiscal decentralization, which is discussed next.
C. Fiscal Decentralization
The highly centralized nature of India’s fiscal federal system
complicates the goal of improving municipal financial capacity. This article
suggests that fiscal decentralization has not occurred because
municipalities do not have the resources to effectively implement newly
devolved powers. Consistent with a fiscal federal structure, municipalities
have long depended on resources allocated by the national and state
governments. Indeed, the JnNURM was a national program that tied
financial support to reforms at the state and local levels, an illustration of
the centralized manner in which decentralization has been pursued in India.
Encouraging cities to diversify their own funding bases and tap into new
revenue sources is not only administratively challenging, but also
contradicts the theoretical efficiency of a fiscal federal system.

241. See id. at 35–36 (suggesting that the State Election Commissions be given the power to
determine the reservation of seats in local government elections).
242. Id. at 30–31.
243. Id.
244. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 256.
245. See GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 30; NAT’L INST. OF
URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 92, at ix (noting a challenge in that municipalities must often develop
plans in an “institutional vacuum” because the district-level or metropolitan level plans are not prepared
properly, which reduces the availability of regional and district information).
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1. India’s Fiscal Federal Structure is Highly Centralized
Fiscal federalism is, at its roots, a theory about how fiscal powers
should be divided between multiple levels of government in order to
promote allocative efficiency and productive efficiency. This theory holds
that the central government should be in charge of macroeconomic
stabilization, income redistribution, and the provision of certain “national”
public goods. In contrast, subnational governments should be responsible
for the provision of local public goods and services.246 The centralized
collection of resources through taxes and decentralized expenditures is
intended to promote allocative efficiency.247 As a result, each level of
government leverages its own comparative advantage and each subnational
actor determines which services deserve the highest priority.
By design, India’s constitutional structure features a “vertical
mismatch,”248 also known as a “non-correspondence” problem,249 in that
the resources collected by the central government far exceed the tasks
assigned to it.250 Fiscal transfers are required to correct vertical imbalances
between different tiers of government.251 This intentional mismatch
between resource generation and expenditure reflects the idea that many
taxes are more efficiently collected by a higher tier of government.252
Expenditures are decentralized to improve efficiency because lower levels
of government are theoretically better informed.253 The fact that that the
resources collected by the central government surpass the tasks assigned to
it is not inherently problematic. Rather, mechanisms for remedying this
asymmetrical taxation are theoretically built into the federal system. It is
only when these mechanisms break down that issues arise.
246. See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1120–30 (1999)
(noting the presumption of the decentralized provision of public goods with localized efforts).
247. AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 14–15, 25 (describing other economic rationales for federalism,
including those based on adequacy, discipline and equity); Mukhopadhayay, supra note 15, at 55 (“In a
normative sense, the problem of fiscal federalism is to find the efficient pairing of responsibility for
deciding how much of and what kinds of government-provided goods and services to produce with
geographically defined subsets of the population.” (citation omitted)).
248. Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 22.
249. Mukhopadhayay, supra note 15, at 58.
250. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 226.
251. AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 15–16 (noting also that India’s fiscal federal model also tends to
exacerbate horizontal imbalances, i.e. between different states within the country).
252. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 226 (noting that “[T]he
Union Government with its nation-wide jurisdiction is better placed to administer taxes like Income
Tax, Customs & Excise Duty and the local government with its intimate knowledge of local conditions
is best suited to administer taxes like the Property Tax.”).
253. AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 15; Andres Rodriguez-Pose & Nicolas Gill, The Global Trend
Towards Devolution and Its Implications, 21 ENV’T. & PLAN. 333 (2003) (discussing the efficiency
advantages lower level governance can engender).
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India has utilized two primary mechanisms for remedying
intentionally asymmetrical taxing and spending between the central and
state governments.254 First are transfers to the states via the Finance
Commission, a unique institution without a parallel in other federal
countries.255 Convened every five years, the Finance Commission makes
recommendations about collected taxes and duties, which it is
constitutionally required to divide between the central government and
states.256 The share of proceeds of central taxes to be divided between the
Center and the states is known as vertical distribution, while the share to be
divided between the states is known as horizontal distribution.257 Plan
transfers by the Planning Commission were the second mechanism for
transferring funds to the states,258 but as noted earlier, this institution has
since been dissolved.259 The Planning Commission was established as a
permanent body in 1950 and played a critical role in developing schemes
when India’s public sector played a large role in the economy.260 The
Planning Commission was considered “extra-constitutional” because it was
not explicitly referenced in the Constitution.261 Rather, its power derived

254. See MAHENDRA PRASAD SINGH, INDIAN FEDERALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 151 (2011)
(describing “four major channels of fiscal transfers from the Union to the State: (a) through the
constitutionally entrenched Finance Commission of India, (b) through the extra-constitutional (though
not unconstitutional) Planning Commission created by a cabinet resolution of the Nehru government in
1951, (c) through the Union ministries via centrally sponsored schemes in Union, State, and Concurrent
jurisdictions alike, and (d) through central grants-in-aid for disaster management, if and when one
occurs.”).
255. See generally INDIA CONST. art 280 (stating in part: “(1) The President shall, within two years
from the commencement of this Constitution and thereafter at the expiration of every fifth year or at
such earlier time as the President considers necessary, by order constitute a Finance Commission which
shall consist of a Chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President.”); AGARWAL,
supra note 15, at 5, 43, 46 (noting that under the 80th Amendment to the Constitution of India, Article
270 was significantly revised and Article 272 was omitted); AGARWAL, supra note 15 at 48 (“The
Finance Commission is responsible for forecasting the revenues and expenditures of the Center and
states, and then for developing a formula for distribution.”); Chaubey, Federalism in India, supra note
16, at 4, 7.
256. INDIA CONST. art. 275; AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 44 (indicating that these are made via
divisible taxes and duties under Articles 269, 270 and 273 and grants in aid under Article 275);
Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 23, 34.
257. Mukhopadhayay, supra note 15, at 61–64 (noting that the Finance Commission has the
authority to provide grants-in-aid, which are above and beyond the sharing of revenue and are generally
designed to cover non-Plan revenue gaps).
258. AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 43. Given that the Planning Commission was replaced by NITI
Aayog in 2015 by Prime Minister Modi, the future mechanism for such transfers is unclear.
259. Singh Faults Modi, supra note 182.
260. Vikas Dhoot, Planning Commission an Old House That Can’t Be Repaired: Narendra Modi,
ECON TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-08-16/news/528736
64_1_systems-reform-commission-planning-commission-independent-evaluation-office.
261. Chaubey, Federalism in India, supra note 16, at 4.
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from Article 282 of the Constitution, which enabled it to provide grants for
any public purpose.262 Additionally, the Planning Commission’s five-year
plans usually provided for discretionary transfers via central schemes, such
as the JnNURM, which were managed by union ministries.263
Approximately two-thirds of resources had been transferred via the Finance
Commission and one-third had been transferred through the Planning
Commission.264 As discussed below, states were then responsible for
disbursing funds to the local level. Given the current functions of the NITI
Aayog,265 it is not yet clear what role it will play in allocation of resources
to the states.
India’s fiscal federal system has been complicated by a perceived
duplication of effort between the Finance Commission and the Planning
Commission. The Finance Commission was initially envisioned to be the
chief, or exclusive, mechanism for transferring funds between the central
and state governments through a process intended to be free of political
interference.266 The Planning Commission gained increasing power because
of its ability to target funding to projects deemed important by the Center.
This power made the Planning Commission the “unintended channel” for
transferring resources, leading to a perception that it was dominant.267
Given the duplication of effort between the Finance Commission and
the Planning Commission, it was suggested that the two institutions
merge.268 Soon after taking office, Prime Minister Modi indicated that he

262. Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 23.
263. See AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 43; Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15,
at 23.
264. Singh, supra note 128, at 12; TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME I, supra note 47, at 81
(noting that of the amounts allocated by the 12th Five Year Plan (2012-2017), approximately 75% of
gross budget support went to the Center, including predominantly to centrally sponsored schemes, and
the remaining 25% went to the states); Mukhopadhayay, supra note 15, at 66.
265. Functions, NITI AAYOG, GOV’T OF INDIA, http://niti.gov.in/content/functions.php (last visited
Sept. 23, 2015).
266. Singh, supra note 128, at 12.
267. AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 59; Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 23;
Rao & Singh, supra note 136, at 53 (noting that the first Finance Commission recommended that a
permanent organization to study state finances be created. There has been some speculation that the
failure to implement this recommendation was a deliberate attempt to restrict the scope of the Finance
Commission relative to the Planning Commission); Dhoot, supra note 260 (noting that the influence of
the Planning Commission waned in the 1980s and 1990s as economic liberalization allowed a greater
role for the private sector, but its influence has been prominent in recent years); Singh, supra note 128,
at 15 (noting that the fact that the Planning Commission is a permanent body, while the Finance
Commission is convened anew every five years, has also given greater authority to the Planning
Commission).
268. Singh, supra note 128, at 15.

2015

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO DECENTRALIZATION

125

would replace the Planning Commission with a new organization.269 While
the proposed institution was originally supposed to be called the National
Development Reforms Commission (NDRC),270 it ultimately became the
NITI Aayog. As the Cabinet Resolution creating the NITI Aayog notes, the
rise of “market forces and larger global shifts” means that there is also a
“diminished role of centralised [sic] planning.” 271 As this article was going
to press, the future of the NITI Aayog remained unclear.
While a fiscal federal structure is intended to be centralized with
respect to collection, India’s approach historically limited the extent to
which expenditures could be decentralized. For over 50 years, India’s
constitutional structure only allowed certain resources to be shared with the
states, which reinforced the centralized nature of India’s federal model.
This approach was also at odds with the theory of federalism.272 In 2000,
India’s Constitution was changed through the 80th Amendment so that all
taxes and duties collected by the union could be shared with the states.273
Yet even under the revised provisions, certain revenues must be shared
with the states and others may be shared.274
An appropriately designed fiscal federalism system requires both
adequate resources to discharge responsibilities, as well as elasticity of
resources to meet preferences and needs. Yet, this economic theory needs
to mesh with the political reality in India. While the states are equal as a
matter of law, in many respects, they are politically in a subordinate
position because they depend on the Center for funding.275 The central
government’s ability to call “President’s Rule” also reinforces the inferior
269. See Dhoot, supra note 260.
270. Sanjeeb Mukherjee, New Body Set to Replace Planning Commission, BUS. STANDARD (Aug.
16, 2014), http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/new-body-set-to-replaceplanningcommission-114081600035_1.html.
271. See Press Note, Cabinet Secretariat, Gov’t of India, Government Constitutes National
Institution for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog (Jan. 1, 2015), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/Print
Release.aspx?relid=114268. See also Puja Mehra, Move to Scrap Planning Commission Raises
Constitutional Questions, HINDU (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/move-toscrap-planning-commission-raises-constitutional-questions/article6324619.ece (raising numerous concerns about the original proposal); Singh Faults Modi, supra note 182 (criticizing the replacement of the
Planning Commission with NITI Aayog).
272. AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 58 (noting that previously, only income and excise taxes could
be shared with the states).
273. Id. at 5; Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 28 (describing the 89th
Amendment bill passed by the Indian parliament as more “revolutionary” than originally intended). See
also id. at 26 (describing the original provisions as “clumsy and unnecessary” as well as “baffling and
mind boggling” because they made “meticulous distinction” between items that had to be distributed
under Article 270 (income tax) and those that could be distributed under Article 272 (excise duty)).
274. Chaubey, Federalism in India, supra note 16, at 7.
275. See Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 21.
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position of the states.276 The states’ ability to borrow from the market is
also limited, which only heightens this dependence.277 In reality,
discretionary control of resources by the Center combined with the
decentralized expenditure by the states has also contributed to fiscal
irresponsibility at the state level.278 While the fiscal federal model calls for
the decentralization of expenditures, the subordinate position of the states,
strong centralizing tendencies in India, and concerns about fiscal
irresponsibility have limited the extent to which this is possible.
The relationship between the Center and the states mirrors that
between the states and municipalities. The Central Finance Commission
(CFC) requires the fair and equitable transfer of resources from the Center
to the states,279 and the 74th CAA established a similar arrangement
between the states and local bodies through the creation of State Finance
Commissions (SFC).280 As constitutionally created bodies, the SFCs enable
the state governments to devolve funds to local bodies and to authorize
local bodies to impose taxes and duties.281 Every five years, the SFCs are
required to review the financial positions of the municipalities.282 Just as
the CFC makes recommendations about how funds should be divided
between the Center and the states, the SFCs are required to make
recommendations as to how funds should be split between the states and
local bodies.283
While the 74th CAA outlined eighteen functions that states may
devolve to the municipalities,284 as set forth in the Twelfth Schedule, it did
not provide a corresponding “municipal finance list.” Rather, states have
discretion to assign finances to municipalities “by law.” Although states are

276. Aseema Sinha, Political Foundations of Market-Enhancing Federalism: Theoretical Lessons
from India and China, 37 COMP. POL. 337, 344 (2005).
277. AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 40; Mukhopadhayay, supra note 15, at 58.
278. Mukhopadhayay, supra note 15, at 65; see also A.C.K. Nambiar, Federal State Financial
Relations in India: The Post-Liberalisation Period, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA, supra note 15, at
53; Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 34–36.
279. See INDIA CONST., art. 280.
280. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 226; See India Const.,
art. 243X.
281. See INDIA CONST., art. 243 (noting that the power of the municipalities is derived from the
state government and devolved at the discretion of the state).
282. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 61, 66 (noting that
SFCs are tasked with assessing the resource gaps in all urban and rural local bodies and developing a
plan to transfer funds).
283. Id. at 61.
284. ATAL MISSION, supra note 113, at 30 (noting that the Modi’s new urban renewal scheme, the
Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation, will provide additional funds to those states
that devolve these 18 powers down to ULBs).
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limited in the taxes that they can collect, those for which they have
responsibility can also be assigned to local governments. These include
property taxes, vehicle taxes, professional taxes, and octroi, to the extent
this last category still exists.285 As a result, the constitution reinforces a
structure whereby states are highly dependent on the central government,
and in turn, the municipalities are highly dependent on the states.286
2. Numerous Barriers Exist to Municipal Fiscal Empowerment
Despite the breadth of functions that are to be devolved to
municipalities, a commensurate amount of resources has not also been
devolved.287 Local bodies across India require financial support to provide
core services, such as drinking water, sewerage, solid waste management,
and street lights, and to provide for operational infrastructure and
staffing.288 Their lack of funding is a key reason for the poor operation and
maintenance of urban infrastructure and inadequate service delivery.
The JnNURM sought to improve access to funding for municipal
infrastructure and delivery of basic services by incentivizing reforms at the
local and state level designed to promote the 74th CAA.289 The JnNURM
fiscal reforms were broadly focused on three areas. The first area was the
development of more effective SFCs in order to reduce delays in the
transfer of funds to municipalities. The second area involved increasing the
revenue base through improved taxation and user charges for public
services, such as water supply. The third area entailed private sector
participation in the delivery of public services.290 Each of these is discussed
in turn.

285. AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 38–39.
286. MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at i.
287. Id. at viii, 6; GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 223.
288. THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 173.
289. MINISTRY OF URBAN EMP’T & POVERTY ALLEVIATION & MINISTRY OF URBAN DEV., supra
note 74, at 12–13 (noting that other JnNURM state-level reforms include reforming rent control laws,
reducing stamp duty, enacting public disclosure laws and community participation laws, and expanding
the role of elected municipal officials in city planning).
290. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 232–33; NAT’L INST.
OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at vii (finding that, as of 2005, “there exists a problem of ineffective
participation in the decision-making process despite adoption of the policy of reservation, delays in the
transfer of funds to the municipalities despite constitution of State Finance Commissions, poor recovery
from various tax and non-tax sources despite devolution of powers, etc.”); THORNTON, supra note 103,
at 118.
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a. State Finance Commissions (SFCs)
State Finance Commissions often do not function properly, which
negatively impacts the financial revenues of a municipality.291 The quality
of SFC reports is inconsistent, due in part to the lack of data from urban
and local bodies, limited capacity, and lack of ownership by state
governments.292 The Central Finance Commission has recommended that
SFC reports follow a uniform template and adopt reporting periods that are
synchronous with the CFC reports.293 SFCs are urged to conduct more
thorough analyses of the municipalities’ finances to make
recommendations regarding the efficiency of tax collection, expenditures,
operational efficiencies, and other related issues.294 With the goal of
incentivizing the delivery of quality public services, the CFC has also
recommended that SFCs consider linking the devolution of funds to the
level/quality of civic amenities that the citizens could expect.295 SFCs are
also encouraged to produce reports that are more consistent, thorough, and
transparent.
Even where SFCs are functioning well, state governments often do not
follow their recommendations and, as a result, do not commit adequate
resources to local governments.296 In contrast, the central government of
India generally accepts the recommendations of the CFC, even though they
are not mandatory.297 When states do not implement the recommendations
of SFCs,298 the transmission of funds to local bodies is delayed despite the
fact that states have to pay interest to the local bodies.299 Resultantly, many
municipalities have unpredictable funds transfers from state
governments,300 which compromise their ability to discharge their

291. NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at vi (“Municipalities historically faced
numerous challenges, including inefficiency in the conduct of business, ineffective participation by the
weaker sections of the population in local governance, weak financial condition, lack of transparency in
the planning and implementation of projects, etc.”); Rao & Bird, supra note 32, at 219.
292. THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 171.
293. Id. at 158–71.
294. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 66–67.
295. Id. at 66.
296. Id. at 65.
297. Id.
298. MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–2 (“Following the recommendations of the State Finance
Commissions (SFCs) and taking into account the devolutions made by the Central Finance Commission
(CFC), the State Governments are required to devolve resources to their local bodies.”); Mohanty,
supra note 29, at 128.
299. THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 167.
300. See HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 128.
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responsibilities.301 The reluctance of states to follow the recommendations
of SFCs that are working well is yet another barrier to improvements in
municipal finance in India.302
b. Expanding Revenue Base
Local bodies in India suffer from a lack of an independent tax base.303
The sources of municipal revenues in India—taxes, user charges and fees,
transfers, and loans—are relatively narrow compared to international
benchmarks and other federal countries like the United States, Canada,
Brazil, and China.304 For example, while local government revenues in the
U.S. accounted for fifteen percent of total government revenues in 2001,
the figure in India was only three percent.305 There are four ways for Indian
local bodies to try to expand their revenue base, but each strategy faces
challenges.
First, municipalities can persuade state governments to devolve more
sources of revenue down to them. Even though the urban population in
India is growing faster than the national rate, municipalities are
increasingly dependent on the Center and states for financial resources.306
However, the states have been historically reluctant to share any financial
resources with local bodies, which stems in part from the lack of
administrative capacity (as discussed in Section III.B) and in part from
their sense of marginalization by the central government (as discussed in
Section III.A).307 Ironically, the inability of municipalities to generate

301. See THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 149, 161. But see NAT’L INST. OF
URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at x (noting that “reports prepared to assess the status of SFC
recommendations show that the proportion of recommendations accepted (either fully, partly or in a
modified form) is much higher than those which have not been accepted.”).
302. See ATAL MISSION, supra note 113, at 30 (indicating that Modi’s new urban renewal scheme,
the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation, will incentivize states to adopt SFC
recommendations within an 18 month time period).
303. See Mohanty, supra note 29, at 128 (describing why “the framework of revenue assignment
in the 74th Amendment Act is incomplete”); Rao & Bird, supra note 32, at 213 (“In India, it is clear
that lack of adequate resources is one key reason for municipal bodies not providing satisfactory levels
of the assigned public services.”).
304. See MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at iii, viii–ix, 160 (noting that Indian ULBs collect and
spend considerably less per capita than their counterparts in Poland, South Africa, and Brazil. The only
exception to this rule is Mexico whose local bodies collect and spend approximately the same amount
per capita as local bodies in the Indian state of Maharashtra); see also Mohanty, supra note 29, at 129
(showing a list of revenue sources in Table 5.3).
305. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii.
306. Id. at 223–24.
307. THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 136–37.
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matching funds has, at times, impeded their ability to participate in many
central government schemes.308
Second, local bodies can try to raise new sources of tax revenue.309
Such a strategy may be politically difficult, however, as many have
expressed an aversion to introducing new taxes until the current tax
administration system is improved. In India, tax evasion is widespread at
the national, state and local level.310 For example, in 2012, the Chief of
India’s Central Bureau of Investigation reported that over 500 billion
dollars have been illegally deposited in overseas tax havens.311 Until
citizens have faith in the government’s ability to ensure compliance with
existing tax measures, it will be difficult to secure public support for new
tax measures at any level of government.
Third, local bodies can improve the efficiency and utilization of
existing revenue collection mechanisms. Property tax is the most important
source of revenue for local governments312 because land is a municipality’s
biggest asset.313 However, only approximately sixty to seventy percent of
most urban properties in India are taxed. Unsatisfactory records of property
title, urban sprawl that expands municipal boundaries, unauthorized
construction, and corruption all complicate the collection of property
taxes.314 Unintentional conflicts arise with state agencies as well. For
example, if a state-level parastatal agency develops an area, then it may not
be handed over to a municipal body for some time, preventing the
collection of local taxes.315 In order for there to be an improvement in
property tax collection, these urban management issues need to be
addressed.
308. NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 92, at xii.
309. Savage & Dasgupta, supra note 24, at 48 (“Traditionally, the provision of urban infrastructure
and services has been among the primary functions of the government where the funding of complete
service delivery is sourced out of tax revenues.”).
310. 100 Big Traders May Be Netted for Local Body Tax Evasion, TIMES INDIA (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/100-big-traders-may-be-netted-for-local-body-taxevasion/articleshow/39708736.cms.
311. India ‘Loses $500bn to Tax Havens’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-india-17013314; Ministry of Finance Seeks Help in Recovery of Tracing Tax Defaulters,
TIMES INDIA (Aug. 30, 2015), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/ india-business/Ministry-ofFinance-seeks-help-in-recovery-of-tracing-tax-defaulters/articleshow/48728 848.cms (noting that this
problem has become so severe that the Indian Ministry of Finance recently reached out to the public for
help tracking down “high value” income tax defaulters).
312. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 227 (noting that local
governments generally administer property tax because that requires an understanding of local
conditions); Rao & Bird, supra note 32, at 215.
313. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 268.
314. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 228.
315. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 268.
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Fourth and finally, local bodies can try to mobilize non-tax sources of
revenue by charging user fees for the provision of public services, such as
water and sewerage.316 User fees for municipal services are difficult to
implement because they require a level of political acceptance and
consensus.317 Unclear land tenure, for example in slums, may prevent a
municipality from installing service connections, even when residents may
be willing to pay for such connections.318 User fees set at rates too high to
be affordable may also impose public health costs and create human rights
consequences. While the imposition of user fees may represent a significant
opportunity for municipalities looking to expand their revenue base, the
potential for these fees to further marginalize the urban poor or pose public
health risks needs to be carefully considered.
c. Private Sector Participation (Market-Based Decentralization)
Indian municipalities are increasingly turning to the private sector to
fund infrastructure improvements and the delivery of basic services.319 The
term market-based decentralization is used to identify situations in which
decentralization is associated with the transfer of responsibilities not to
lower levels of government, but to private companies. There are two ways
that private companies are becoming involved in urban infrastructure
financing: they are working with local governments to provide services for
a certain percentage of the revenue (public-private partnerships), and they
are lending money to municipal governments, for example in the form of
municipal bonds.
The JnNURM also embraced market-based decentralization by
encouraging ULBs to borrow from capital markets and engage in public
private partnerships (PPPs). The JnNURM was the first major scheme of
the government of India that fostered PPPs in urban sectors such as solid
waste, water supply, sewage, and urban transport. The JnNURM helped
facilitate municipal borrowing from capital markets by working with four
major credit agencies to make sure the JnNURM cities all had credit
ratings.320 The newly formed NITI Aayog will also likely embrace a greater

316. MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at 40; Mohanty, supra note 29, at 136–37; Rao & Bird, supra
note 32, at 214.
317. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 258.
318. See generally Sharmila L. Murthy, Land Security and the Challenges of Realizing the Human
Right to Water and Sanitation in the Slums of Mumbai, India, 14 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. (2012).
319. Anand Sahasranaman & Vikram Kapur, The Practice of PPP in Urban Infrastructure, in
URBANISATION IN INDIA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at
176, 176; SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 24, at 173–75.
320. See Union Budget 2014–15: Stress on Development of Urban Areas, ZEE MEDIA BUREAU
(July 10, 2014), http://zeenews.india.com/business/indian-budget-2014/union-budget-2014-15-stress-
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role for the private sector. Indeed, the Cabinet Resolution that created the
NITI Aayog states that “[i]n the past, governance may have been rather
narrowly construed as public governance. In today’s changed dynamics –
with ‘public’ services often being delivered by ‘private’ entities, and the
greater scope for ‘participative citizenry’, governance encompasses and
involves everyone.”321
The direct borrowing model for private sector investment and the PPP
model have both had limited success in India so far. One form of direct
borrowing—municipal bonds—was believed to be an especially promising
way to finance urban infrastructure.322 Municipal bonds were seen as
particularly attractive because of their greater borrowing potential323 and
longer maturity periods.324 While over twenty municipal bonds were issued
in the late 1990s and 2000s,325 there have been no municipal bonds issued
since 2010. This recent stagnation of the municipal bond market has been
attributed to low municipal credit scores and the lack of a sound regulatory
framework. However, there are a number of indications that India is
looking to revive its municipal bond market. In January 2014, India’s
capital regulator announced the creation of a “twenty-odd” person
committee that will make recommendations about how to facilitate the
development of the municipal bond market.326 In July 2014, India’s
Finance Minister announced a ten-fold increase in funds for an
organization dedicated to improving municipal credit scores and
infrastructure projects.327 There have also been suggestions that municipal
bonds may be used, at least in part, to fund Modi’s “Smart Cities” plan.328
The recently released guidelines indicate that Modi’s new urban renewal

on-development-of-urban-areas_103615.html [hereinafter Union Budget] (acknowledging the
“participation of several banks to promote and finance infrastructure projects”); ATAL MISSION, supra
note 113 (noting that the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation aims to finish what
the JnNURM started and issue credit ratings for those urban local bodies that have not yet received a
rating).
321. Cabinet Secretariat Resolution, supra note 182, at 8.
322. Sahasranaman & Kapur, supra note 319, at 181.
323. Shahana Sheikh & Mukul Asher, A Case for Developing the Municipal Bond Market in India,
42 ASCI J. MGMT. 1, 4 (2012).
324. In finance, a maturity refers to the “specific date at which the principal amount of the bond is
repaid.” STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 194 (4th ed. 2001).
325. Sheikh & Asher, supra note 323, at 6.
326. Manju Dalal, India to Boost Muni Market, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2014), http:// www.reuters.com/
article/2014/01/17/india-bonds-municipal-idUSL2N0KQ0IB20140117.
327. Union Budget, supra note 320.
328. Arup Roychoudhury, Municipal Bonds May Help Finance Smart Cities, FIN. EXPRESS (Aug.
7, 2014), http://archive.financialexpress.com/news/municipal-bonds-may-help-finance-smart-cities/127
7156/1.
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scheme, AMRUT, will also try to increase the availability of municipal
bonds.329
As with municipal bonds, the extent to which PPPs will be used to
finance urban infrastructure is unclear.330 One large concern about PPPs is
the potential for collusion between companies and bureaucrats. This
concern has prompted some, including recent Nobel Prize winner Jean
Tirole, to argue for independent evaluation of PPP contracts.331 Another
potential way to prevent collusion between public and private partners is to
allow the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India to audit publicprivate partnerships. In August 2014, the CAG asked the government for
this authority.332 If these concerns about collusion can be addressed, PPPs
could be a very important source of urban infrastructure financing.333 The
Planning Commission, which has since been replaced with NITI Aayog,
estimated that between thirteen and twenty-three percent of urban sector
investments could potentially be made using the PPP model.334 The authors
of the Twelfth Year Plan obviously envisioned a future for the PPP model
seeing as they used it as the basis for their new experiment in melding the
language of political and market-based decentralization.
The Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017) also called for an extended
“4P” framework—People–Private–Public–Partnerships. Experience across
the world indicates that in urban renewal and management, the role of
people in the design of projects and partnerships is more crucial than in
large infrastructure projects such as highways, airports, power plants.335
India’s new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has also embraced the PPPP
model, as illustrated by a recent blog post on his website.336 In fact, the
guidelines of Modi’s new urban renewal scheme, AMRUT, state the

329. ATAL MISSION, supra note 113, at 67.
330. See Ahluwalia, supra note 108, at 54 (“One area in which JNNURM has not been successful
is in motivating ULBs to tap external sources of funding through municipal bonds and/or PPP.”).
331. Mihir Sharma, Four Nobel-Winning Insights that Matter for the Indian Economy, BUS.
STANDARD (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/four-nobel-winninginsights-that-matter-for-the-indian-economy-114101301188_1.html.
332. See Vikas Dhoot, UPA Government Blocked Reforms to Empower CAG:Vinod Rai, ECON.
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-15/news/53942910_1_
vinod-rai-cag-comptroller-auditor-general.
333. CAG Asks Government to Ensure All Accounts of PPP Projects Are Audited, ECON. TIMES
(Aug. 4, 2014), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-08-04/news/52428582_1_apexauditor-cag-auditor-general.
334. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 333.
335. Id. at 332.
336. People Public Private Partnership, NARENDRAMODI.IN, http://www.narendramodi.in/
people-public-private-partnership/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
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government’s intention to use the PPPP model to finance the upkeep of
parks, playgrounds, and other recreational areas.337
When India’s “Smart Cities” plan goes into effect, the role played by
the private sector will increase. The plan’s draft concept note states that a
city covered under the plan “must be able to attract investments and funds
from private players,”338 including from municipal bonds and PPPs. More
specifically, the plan recommends that creditworthy local governments
issue tax-free municipal bonds and deploy PPPs as a means of leveraging
private sector financing.339 India’s Urban Development Minister recently
remarked that “the key to building smart cities is private investments.”340
India is in the midst of an important shift in the financing of urban
infrastructure;341 less than a decade ago, the private sector played a much
smaller role. The JnNURM encouraged the use of two forms of marketbased financing: PPPs and municipal bonds. Although each financing
mechanism comes with its own set of challenges, both mechanisms are still
believed to offer some promise. While the JnNURM will soon be phased
out, private sector investment will likely continue to play a large role in
urban financing under Modi’s “Smart Cities” plan.342
3. Greater Coordination is Needed
The inadequate administrative capacity of municipalities combined
with the poor functioning of the SFCs has meant that municipalities are not
in a position to discharge their increased responsibilities. It should thus
come as no surprise that a recent evaluation of the JnNURM stated that
while the scheme “has brought about a change in the mindset of the States’
and the ULBs’ [urban local bodies] to focus more on strengthening their
financial and technical capabilities, there is still a long way to go before
they will be in a position to reduce their dependence on funding via grants
from the Central and/or State Government.”343
Fiscal decentralization in India is plagued by the reality that without
an effective means for remedying the “vertical mismatch,” it is challenging
to implement fiscal federalism. The irony is that this push towards

337. ATAL MISSION, supra note 113, at 29.
338. Draft Concept Note on Smart City Scheme, supra note 8, at 44.
339. Id. at 41.
340. Private Investments to Help Develop 100 Smart Cities Planned by Govt: Venkaiah Naidu,
ECON. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-27/news/543771
03_1_100-smart-cities-private-investments-urban-local-bodies.
341. See generally Sahasranaman & Kapur, supra note 319, at 188.
342. See ATAL MISSION, supra note 113, at 10.
343. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 252.
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expanding the municipal resource base contradicts the basic premise of the
supposed allocative efficiency of fiscal federalism. An assumption implicit
in this theory is that functions discharged at the local level can be financed
by higher levels of government.344 Indeed, the theory of public finance
indicates that the central government of India is better positioned to address
re-distribution challenges through centralized revenue collection followed
by inter-governmental transfers. However, a report prepared by the
research arm of the Reserve Bank of India has observed that “there is no
appropriate model of inter-governmental finance for local bodies in India to
tackle the colossal problem of urban poverty.”345 In other words, the theory
of fiscal federalism that drove India’s centralized system of tax collection
will not work unless there are adequate policy mechanisms to enable the
lowest tiers of government to spend the collected revenue. Greater
consultation and partnership across all levels of government in India is
needed to fulfill the promise of cooperative federalism.346
Although the 74th CAA and the municipal reforms promoted by the
JnNURM sought to empower municipalities, these local bodies do not have
significant independent power and have simply implemented central and
state government schemes.347 Persistent resource constraints impede the
states’ ability to allocate sufficient resources down to the municipalities.348
Because the states are unable to adequately provide for local governments,
the Center increasingly has an “indirect stamp” on urban affairs through
schemes like the JnNURM.349 Given the detailed instructions in the
Twelfth Five Year Plan on urban planning and renewal, an irony is
apparent: India has taken a highly centralized approach to creating
decentralization. Indeed, the JnNURM was criticized for the dominant role
of the Center vis-à-vis the states and for inadequate focus on the political
processes needed to strengthen municipalities.350

344. MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at viii.
345. Id. at 6. See also Chaubey, Federalism in India, supra note 16, at 3 (recognizing that India’s
approach to structuring the government has shifted between emphasizing provincial autonomy and
federal centralization in recent history); Mukhopadhayay, supra note 15, at 66 (suggesting that the
“kaleidoscopic” set of changes in the persons and parties leading the states has made it difficult for the
state and center to build meaningful relationships).
346. Mukhopadhayay, supra note 15, at 67.
347. THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 160.
348. TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 331 (calling for strengthening
municipal finance through the creation of robust tax and non-tax based revenue streams, by attracting
private capital to the urban sector, and by systematically monetizing land); MOHANTY ET AL., supra
note 2, at 1–2.
349. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 51.
350. Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 113.
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The 74th CAA envisioned that municipalities would be more
financially robust and that their long-term sustainability would depend on
greater financial authority.351 But decentralization is not fiscally neutral.
Rather, it entails an additional burden on the states, requiring additional
financing to achieve higher levels of service delivery and staffing.352 For
example, certain powers, such as accounting and using GIS to improve
property taxation, require an investment in technical skills and equipment,
which were not funded under the JnNURM.353 Moreover, fiscal
decentralization also requires a certain degree of flexibility through untied
resources. The inherent asymmetry in a fiscal federalism system requires
that local authorities be able to establish priorities, create new schemes, and
allocate funds.354 While funding under the JnNURM was earmarked for
infrastructure development and basic services, there has not been a similar
earmarking of funding to assist with devolution of power.
Calls to restructure the system of municipal finances in the country
have been made.355 Various studies commissioned by India’s central
government have urged that the Constitution be amended to specifically
create a “Local Bodies Finance List”356 or a “Municipal Finance
Schedule.”357 It has also been suggested that a “special purpose vehicle” be
351. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 223.
352. THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 161.
353. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 257–58.
354. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 17, 60.
355. MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at ix (suggesting a long list of reforms including “revisiting
expenditure assignment and revenue assignment, finding an alternative to Octroi, developing national
consensus on a Municipal Finance Schedule, careful matching of revenues and expenditures based on
Bahl-Linn principles, raising local revenue efforts, reforming property tax, using urban land as a
resource, adopting ‘users pay’, ‘beneficiaries pay’ and ‘polluters pay’ principles, linking individual
services with user charges and collective services with benefit taxes, restructuring inter-governmental
transfers with a simple distributive formula that gives due weights to needs, rights to minimum basic
services, incentives to performance and inter-jurisdictional equity, easing borrowing restrictions on
ULBs, financing urban infrastructure through exploring the options of i) specialized banks for
municipal lending, ii) municipal bond markets, and iii) specialized municipal funds and strengthening
the creditworthiness of ULBs, developing public-private partnerships, addressing poverty alleviation
through linkage to buoyant redistributive taxes, improving expenditure management and disclosure,
promoting fiscal responsibility and professionalizing municipal management”).
356. HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 129 (also outlining other ways that the constitution can be
amended, such as by enabling urban local bodies to exclusively levy certain taxes (property, profession,
entertainment, and advertisement) and to constitutionally mandate a revenue-sharing formula).
357. See THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 158 (noting that a proposal to
transfer a share of the divisible pool directly to the local bodies would “vitiate the Constitutional
mandate that the Finance Commission recommend augmentation of the consolidated fund of the states
on the basis of the recommendations of the SFCs”); GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS
COMM’N, supra note 2, at 227 (noting that the National Commission to Review the Working of the
Constitution “recommends that the Eleventh and the Twelfth Schedules should be restructured in a
manner that creates a separate fiscal domain for Panchayats and Municipalities. Accordingly, Articles
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created by the national government to release funds directly to
municipalities, thereby bypassing the state.358 However, it may not be
practicable to amend the Constitution to create a separate tax domain for
local governments.359 Municipalities do not have the capacity to collect
such taxes, and these proposed changes may have an adverse impact on the
financing of State Plans.360 The need for greater cooperative federalism is
clear.
There is need for improvement in the relations between all branches of
India’s government. Of particular importance, however, is the relationship
between the federal government and the states. This analysis highlights the
extent to which the federal government’s efforts at decentralization have
been stymied by state government reluctance to devolve power. A greater
effort needs to be made by the federal government to assess whether this
reluctance is related to a lack of capacity at the municipal level. The federal
government should work with the states to identify powers that could be
feasibly devolved to municipalities. The federal government should also
counsel states on the importance of pursuing fiscal and political
decentralization together. If power is devolved before financing, the local
government will not be able to exercise its functions appropriately. If
financing is devolved before power, then municipalities may simply
become more wasteful in their spending. In order to achieve effective
decentralization and cooperative federalism, greater consultation between
the federal and state governments is necessary.
CONCLUSION
Cities are increasingly important actors in the global economy.
Projected to have the fastest rate of urban growth, India presents a
fascinating case study for understanding how the constitutional fabric in
which cities are embedded influences their capacity to be autonomous legal
actors. Moreover, with the landslide 2014 election of Prime Minister Modi,
India is now poised to launch a series of new urban renewal schemes and
243H and 243X should be amended making it mandatory for the Legislature of the States to make laws
devolving powers to the Panchayats and Municipalities.”); MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at ix, 1 (“A
‘Municipal Finance Schedule’ for assignment to the ULBs to match the list of functions included in the
12th Schedule may comprise property tax including vacant land tax, taxation of Central and State
Government properties (or service charges in lieu thereof), professional tax, entertainment tax,
advertisement tax, business licensing fee or tax, motor vehicle tax or a share from the same, planning
permission fee, development impact fee, betterment levy, a surcharge on stamp duty on registration
deeds or a share from it and a proportion of the Value Added Tax.”).
358. THORNTON, supra note 103, at 268.
359. GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 227.
360. Id.
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has already secured support from the U.S. for its “Smart Cities” program.
Now is a critical time for understanding the lessons of prior efforts to
promote decentralization and urban renewal.
Through the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, India paved the way
for a dramatic shift in power to urban local bodies. Decentralization
presented an opportunity to enhance grassroots democracy by bringing
power closer to the people and to improve urban areas through allocative
efficiency gains. Although the 74th CAA was enacted in 1992, it was not
until 2005 that the government of India began to meaningfully implement it
through the JnNURM. This national urban renewal scheme represented a
historic policy shift because it tied urban infrastructure and service delivery
improvements to decentralization-oriented governance reforms at the state
and local levels. Yet many of the expected gains did not materialize. This
article argues that this failure is due in large part to India’s constitutional
structure and to the way that decentralization under the 74th CAA has been
pursued.
Decentralization has not yet been successful in India for three key
reasons. First, decentralization has only been partially implemented: the
language of the constitutional amendment has hindered effective political
decentralization, the comparative advantage of parastatal agencies has
made administrative decentralization difficult, and the devolution of
responsibility—but not revenue—to municipalities has hampered fiscal
decentralization.
Second, the analysis has revealed an irony: it has taken a highly
centralized policy like the JnNURM to motivate devolution of power from
states to local bodies under the 74th CAA. But this top-down approach has
reduced the importance of local decision-making, thereby mitigating the
allocative efficiency gains of decentralization. For example, the JnNURM
tied funding to mandated reforms at the state and local levels, inadvertently
exacerbating relations with the states.
The third factor has been the relative weakness of local governance
structures, which has created a Catch-22 situation. Without the necessary
administrative capacity and financial resources, states are not going to
devolve political power to municipalities. Investing in cities may require
slowing down the decentralization process in the short-run by providing
city managers with the skills and training necessary for meaningful
involvement in the planning process, as opposed to rubber-stamping
projects. This might mean that projects come to fruition more slowly, but it
could mean better-run projects in the long-run. Improving the capacity of
local governments is a key step to ensuring greater political, administrative,
and fiscal decentralization.
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In order for decentralization to succeed in India, more effort needs to
be directed towards developing an effective model of cooperative
federalism. The central government does not have a direct relationship with
local bodies: it must work through the states. As a result, it needs to
collaborate with the states to identify which powers could be feasibly
devolved to municipalities and to develop solutions for perceived barriers
to that devolution. Under India’s constitutional structure, the central
government will only be able to achieve the vision of decentralization
embodied in the 74th CAA if the states are willing partners in the endeavor.

